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CRIMINAL LAW
SENTENCING BY PAROLE BOARD: AN EVALUATION*
ANNE M. HEINZ,** JOHN P. HEINZ,*** STEPHEN J. SENDEROWITZf AND
MARY ANNE VANCEt

The paroling process is now under attack on a
broad front. In recent years, an increasing number of
prison reformers, such as the American Friends
Service Committee, 1 have given up on parole and
have endorsed fixed, determinate sentences in its
stead. Academic criminal lawyers have published
both popular 2 and scholarly' attacks on parole.
Criticism of the parole decision process has also been
* Mr. Senderowitz and Ms. Vance collected the data for
this article while enrolled as students at the Northwestern University School of Law, from which they both received the J.D. degree in 1974. No part of this article
is intended to represent the views of the United States Department of Justice nor of the State of Illinois, by whom
they are now employed respectively.
This study was conducted pursuant to a grant from the
CNA Foundation. The authors wish to thank the Foundation for making the research possible and to absolve the
Foundation from responsibility for any of the statements
made. The authors also wish to express their appreciation
to Peter Bensinger, then Director of the Illinois Department
of Corrections, and to David Sturges, then Acting Chairman of the Illinois Parole and Pardon Board, for their
cooperation inithis study and for permission to use the
Board's files. We also acknowledge, with gratitude, our
debt for the valuable advice and assistance of Ralph
Knoohuizen, Research Director of the Chicago Law Enforcement Study Group, of William V. Kauffman, Jr.,
Executive Secretary of the Illinois Parole Board, and of the
staff of the John Howard Association of Illinois.
** Assistant Professor of Political Science, University
of Illinois (Chicago).
*** Professor of Law and Urban Affairs, Northwestern
University.
f Assistant United States Attorney for the Northern

District of Illinois.
t Legal Staff, Consumer Advocate Office, State of Illinois.

voiced by persons with more direct access to the
levers of power; an influential member of Congress,
the Chairman of the House Judiciary Committee's
subcommittee on corrections, has co-authored an
article4 that calls into serious question the assumptions on which parole decisions are based, and the
Governor of Illinois has proposed to eliminate parole
from his state's correctional system. 'The focus of all
these attacks is not the after-care services provided by
parole officers, inadequate as those services may
often be, but rather the parole release decisions
themselves, and the ignorance, pure caprice, bigotry,
or other abuses of discretion that are alleged to
influence those decisions.

These attacks on the parole decision are an
outgrowth of the same, developing skepticism that
has in the past few years called into question our
pursuit of the "rehabilitative ideal." ' The parole
decision', as a key element of a system premised on
rehabilitation or "correction," is seen as a judgment
(usually made by inadequately informed decisionmakers) of whether an inmate meets some subjective,
largely unarticulated standard of "reformation" or
"recovery" from mental or social illness.8 And it has,
"Representative Robert Kastenmeir, co-author of Kastenmeir & Eglit, Parole Release Decision-Making: Rehabilitation, Expertise, and the Demise of Mythology, 22 AM.
U.L. REV. 477 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Kastenmeir &
Eglit].
'See press release (mimeo), Office of the Governor, State
of Illinois, release date February 18, 1975, at ad. 4
[hereinafter cited as press release].
'See, e.g., press release, supra note 5, at Fact Sheet I.
See also Foote, The Sentencing Function, in Roscoe
LAWYERS FOUNDATION, A
REFORM 17, 24, 32 (1972);

'See AMERICAN FRIENDS SERVICE COMMITTEE, STRUGGLE FOR JUSTICE: A REPORT ON CRIME AND PUNISHMENT

POUND-AMERICAN

INAMERICA (1971).
2
See Schwartz, Let's Abolish Parole, READER'S

Kastenmeir & Eglit, supra note 4, at 481-91, for a
summary of critical views of parole.
'See, e.g., F. ALLEN, THE BORDERLAND OF CRIMINAL

DIGEST,

Aug. 1973, at 185.
IN. MORRIS, THE FUTURE OF IMPRISONMENT 28-50
(1974) [hereinafter cited as MORRIS]. Morris does not argue
for outright abolition of parole (in part, at least, because

"the politics of penal reform strongly favor reform recommendations that make use of existing personnel," id. at 36),
but his proposals would certainly alter radically the
functions of parole boards, restricting their discretion
greatly and determining the parole release date "within the
first few weeks" of the inmate's imprisonment. Id. at 35.
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JUSTICE: ESSAYS IN LAW AND CRIMINOLOGY 25-41 (1964)

(chapter: Legal Values 'and the Rehabilitative Ideal);
Martinson, The Paradox of Prison Reform, a four-part
article in THE NEW REPUBLIC, Apr. 1, 1972, at 23;
Apr. 8, 1972, at 13; Apr. 15, 1972, at 17; and Apr.

29, 1972, at 21.
'H. E. Barnes once opined:
The diagnosis and treatment of the criminal is a
highly technical medical and sociological problem for
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by now, been quite well established that our efforts to
predict "dangerousness"-to discriminate between
the persons who will commit crimes in the future and
those who will not-are woefully inaccurate, consist9ently erring on the side of over-prediction. If, then,
parole boards are unable to distinguish the inmates
who have been rehabilitated from those who are
likely to sin again, and if, in any event, rehabilitation
is a vague, largely mythic standard that may provide
the rationale for prolonged, inefficacious institutionalization, the premises on which the parole
system traditionally rested 0 have been destroyedor so the argument goes.
Thus, the policy issue on which the current
literature critical of parole tends to focus is the issue
of which decision-maker should exercise the sentencing discretion. Most of the parole critics suggest that
the modern trend toward vesting increasing amounts
of sentencing discretion in parole boards should be
reversed, returning that discretion to the judiciary. "
Some of the critics would, in the alternative or in
addition, vest a more sizeable portion of the discretion in the legislature through the use of mandatory
sentence statutes. 12 In addressing the issues raised by
these proposals, this article attempts two separate,
but related tasks. First, we examine the question of
how the discretion currently vested in the parole
which the lawyer is rarely any better fitted than a real
estate agent or a plumber.
H. BARNES, THE STORY OF PUNISHMENT 265-66 (1930),
quoted, not with approval, in M. FRANKEL, CRIMINAL
SENTENCES: LAW WITHOUT ORDER 54 (1973) [hereinafter
cited as FRANKEL]. See also MORRIS, supra note 3, at 4,
17-20; O'Leary & Nuffield, Parole Decision-Making
Characteristics: Report of a National Survey, 8 GRIM. L.
BULL. 651 (1972); Comment, ParoleRelease Decisionmaking and the Sentencing Process, 84 YALE L.J. 810, 826

(1975) (hereinafter cited as YALE L.J.).
9
See text accompanying notes 175-81 infra. For a
review of the prediction literature, stressing the inaccuracy
and overprediction see Von Hirsch, Prediction of Criminal
Conduct and Preventive Confinement of Convicted Persons,

21 BUFF. L. REV. 717, 730-40 (1972) [hereinafter cited as
Von Hirschl. Note that, as the term "dangerousness" is used
in this article, it denotes the commission not only of crimes
of violence but of any crime, and is thus approximately

equivalent to "recidivism."
"0 See Kastenmeier & Eglit, supra note 4, at 521-25.
"See, e.g., YALE L.J., supra note 8, at 895-98.

12This, generally, is the approach of the Walker
proposals in Illinois, though those proposals would retain a
reduced amount of discretion in the judiciary. See press
release, supra note 5; Flat-Time-Serving Time in
Prison: A New Way in Illinois, 1975, at 2-3 (Mimeographed memorandum, prepared by the staff of the Illinois Law Enforcement Commission, David Fogel, Executive Director, draft copy only).
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boards has, in fact, been exercised by one of those
boards, the Illinois Parole and Pardon Board-that
is, we identify the factors that appear to influence
Board decisions, and thus, perhaps, shed light on the
allegations that the Boards "abuse" their discretion.
Second, we assess the various possible alternative loci
of sentencing discretion and consider the broader
scientific and policy issues involved in the techniques
6
and objectives of senten ing decisions. To anticipate
our conclusion, very briefly, our analysis suggests
that the popular issue of who should hold the
sentencing discretion is less important than the
question of how the sentencing decisions are
made-not "how" in the sense of "procedural due
process," the right to hearing and to counsel and the
like, but rather in the sense of the nature of the
evidence taken into account, the manner in which
that evidence is weighed, and the nature of the
values and objectives that the decisions are intended
to implement.
PART I: THE PAROLING DECISION

The Existing Literature
Research pertinent to the parole decision-making
process has moved in two directions. The first has
focused on predicting parole outcomes; the second,
on evaluations of the paroling system. Formulae
designed to predict parole success have come primarily from corrections professionals. The work has had
a practical orientation-trying to find a parsimonious but accurate way of deciding whom to recommend for parole-with little explicit theoretical
underpinning. The major product of this concern has
been various kinds of prediction tables; that is, based
on examination of the success and failure of past
parolees, a set of categories is organized so that one
can assess the likely risk that a prisoner would violate
parole. The development of prediction tables started
in the 1920's, and Illinois prison officials adopted
them in 1933.13 These expectancy tables have been
criticized by prison professionals as being overly
technical, inapplicable to individual cases, and not
valid across different populations. "4 On the other
hand, they have been defended for systematizing
5

" See A. BRUCE, A. HARNO, J. LANDESCO & E.
BURGESS, THE WORKINGS OF THE INDETERMINATE
SENTENCE LAW AND THE PAROLE SYSTEM IN ILLINOIS
246-49 (1928); Hart, Predicting Parole Success, 14 J.
CRI. L. & C. 405 (1923). For a brief history see Lejins,
Parole Prediction, An Introductory Statement, 8 CRIME &
DELINQUENCY 210 (1962). See also L. OHLIN, SELECTION
FOR PAROLE (1951).
'See Evjen, Current Thinking on Parole Prediction
Tables, 8 CRIME & DELINQUENCY 215-24 (1962).
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parole recommendations, encouraging efficiency, and
developing more accurate criteria for decisions. 5
The recent research on prediction tables has tried to
refine the predictions for particular groups of offenders (e.g., narcotic users) " and to make the
predictions more appealing to corrections administrators by developing more conceptual and less
mathematical techniques. 1 The parole prediction'
literature has, then, tried to isolate and give appropriate weight to various offender characteristics that
are thought to be clues to future behavior. Prior
criminal record, prior employment experience and
age at release have been among the more accurate
predictors of parole success."
The prediction of parole success is, however, a step
removed from concern with parole board decisions.
More directly in point is the research carried out by
the National Council on Crime and Delinquency in
collaboration with the U.S. Board of Parole. '" The
object of that research was to determine the factors
relied on in federal parole decisions so that the
implicit standards or policies could be made more
explicit. "' In effect, the Federal Parole Board's goal
was to institutionalize its own past decision-making
behavior by determining by a process of induction
what its decision rules had been, and then publishing
those rules as "guidelines" for future decisions. 2 A
Guideline Table has now been established that
utilizes two principal factors, offense severity and
likelihood of success on parole (the "parole prognosis"), the two factors that the Board was found to
15See,

e.g., D.

GLASER, THE

EFFECTIVENESS

OF A

290-92 (1964). See also,
Gottfredson, Summary, Parole Release Decision-Making
Report, NCCD Research Center, 1973, p. 2.
PRISON AND PAROLE SYSTEM

have relied on most. 22 The offense severity measure

averages the Parole Board members' subjective ratings of the gravity of typical offenses.2 The prognosis is based on a "Salient Factor Score" that
summarizes information relating to an inmate's
criminal record and personal background. 24 Seven of
the nine items used in computing this score are
known when the inmate enters the institution. 25 All

inmates are given parole hearings, but the basic
decision has already been made based on the individual's score on the Guideline Table. 2 In some cases,
prison personnel present at the hearing are consulted for their recommendations, 27 but the Yale
Law Journal's observations of federal parole hearings suggest that the inmate's institutional behavior,
including both disciplinary infractions and program
participation, are given little importance in the release decisions. 28
The decision-making procedures of parole boards
have received relatively little systematic attention,
with no conclusive findings. For example, a descriptive study of parole board decision-making in Indiana suggested the importance of board member
variation in determining board outputs, 29 but Gott-

fredson and Ballard, using a statistical analysis,
found little member variation in federal parole
decisions when offender characteristics were
controlled. 20 There is a considerable body of research
that has evaluated parole board procedures from a
policy perspective. 2 ' O'Leary and Nuffield interviewed parole authorities in all fifty-one U.S. jurisdictions and compared the procedures that the parole
agencies reported with the statutory provisions in

2228 C.F.R. § 2.20(0 (1974). For a brief description
"See Babst & Chambers, New Dimensions for Parole of the new parole program see Hoffman & DeGostin, suExpectancy Research, 10 CRIMINOLOGY 353 (1972) pra note 21, at 7-15.
21See YALE L.J., supra note 8, at 823-24.
[hereinafter cited as Babst & Chambers].
24
1d. at 824.
"See Glaser, Prediction Tables as Accounting Devices
2
1Id. Variables are: (1) record of prior convictions, (2)
for Judgesand ParoleBoards, 8 CRIME & DELIQUENCY 239,
254 (1962) [hereinafter cited as Glaser]. For a discussion incarcerations, (3) age at first commitment, (4) whether

of the use of additive scales rather than more sophisticated
weighted scales due to limitations in data quality see
Wilkins, The Problem of Overlap in Experience Table
Construction, Report Number Three, Parole Decision-

Making Report, NCCD Research Center, June 1973.
"See, e.g., Baird, Parole Prediction Study, Report
Number Three, May 1973 (Illinois Department of Corrections, Research Division); Babst & Chambers, supra note
16; Glaser, supra note 17.
"gSee Gottfredson, Hoffman, Seglir & Wilkins, Making
Paroling Policy Explicit, 21 CRIME & DELINQUENCY 34
(1975).
2
1See YALE L.J., supra note 8, at 825.
2

cbmmitment offense involved auto theft, (5) prior parole
violations, (6) history of drug abuse, (7) high school
graduate or equivalent, (8) record of steady employment or
education, and (9) post release plans to live with spouse or
children.
2

Id. at 830 n.97.
"Id. at 831 n.98.
2
'1d. at 831 n.97, 841.
29
Thomas, An Analysis of Parole Selection, 9 CRIME &
DELINQUENCY 173 (1963).
"0 Gottfredson & Ballard, Differences in Parole Decisions Associated with Decision Makers, 3 J. REs. CRIME &
DELINQUENCY 112 (1966).

"For an example and a critique of some of this literature
'See Hoffman & DeGostin, Parole Decision-Making:
Structuring Discretion, 38 FED. PROBATION 7, 14-15 see Comment, The ParoleSystem, 120 U. PA. L. REV. 282
(1971).
(1974).
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effect." They analyzed their findings in terms of the
availability of due process and notice to the offender,
taking the position that practices not meeting those
standards should be changed."3 Very few parole
boards were found to have made explicit policy
statements about their release criteria." . O'Leary
and Nuffield argued that, without such an articulation of parole policy, inmates are deprived of notice
and the systematic evaluation of parole board practices is made very difficult.35 Kastenmeier and
Eglit, "reviewing information about parole decisionmaking that was presented in congressional hearings, argue that parole is based on a rehabilitative
model that has been discredited in much of the
corrections setting. " Like O'Leary and Nuffield, but
from a different perspective, Kastenmeier and Eglit
argue for limiting the wide discretion given to parole
boards.
Research Design
Research Objectives. Given the concern with the

parole decision that was summarized in the introduction to this article, our review of the literature has
disclosed surprisingly little systematic inquiry into
the factors on which parole decisions have, in fact,
been based. This relative paucity of empirical evidence on what the parole boards have been doing
with the considerable discretion granted them 3"
means that the current policy debate on the future of
parole is little constrained by hard fact. The first
objective of this article, therefore, is to provide an
empirical understanding of the parole decision
process. " To that end, we examine the influence that
5

" See O'Leary & Nuffield, Parole Decision-Making
Characteristics:Report of a National Survey, 8 CRIM. L.
BULL. 651 (1972).
55
Id. at 654.
1"Id.
at 675.
35
Id. at 677.
36
Kastenmeier & Eglit, supra note 4, at 521-25.
"'See also sources cited at note 7 supra, and pressrelease, supra note 5, at ad. 1.
3
For a discussion of the need for further research see
also K. DAvis, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE: A PRELIMINARY
INQUIRY 126-33 (1971)
[hereinafter cited as DAVIS];
O'Leary & Nuffield, supra note 8, at 675-77.
39Our goal is not to assess whether the Board acted in
compliance with its statutory mandate. See ILL. REV. STAT.
ch. 38, § 1003-3-5(c) (1973). Nor were we primarily
concerned with determining the goals that the Board
members intended to achieve by their decisions; we did,
however, interview six of the Board members. We asked
them to rank in order of importance different kinds of
information that might be used in making parole decisions,
and also inquired about board decision-making procedures.
[These interviews are hereinafter cited as interview files.]
Because the informants were promised confidentiality, we
do not cite to the individual interviews.
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the various items of information contained in an
inmate's file appear to have had on the Illinois
Parole Board's decisions to grant or deny parole.'
We have attempted to determine the kinds of information that are contained in the files, to isolate the
kinds that appear to influence the Board's decisions,
and, at least tentatively, to determine the relative
influence of those different categories of information.
Description of Variables. The dependent variable

in our analysis is the Board's latest release decision
(parole granted or denied) on each inmate included
in the sample. 1 The independent variables are the
several categories of information included in the
inmate's file."'
The information about the inmate that is available
to the Board at the time of its release decision may be
divided into two broad categories-those facts that
were already known at the time that the judge
imposed sentence, and those circumstances of the
inmate that develop or become known only after
sentencing. This distinction is relevant because of the
policy consideration that, if the facts of greatest
relevance to the parole decision are already known at
the time of sentencing, additional strength is given to
the argument in favor of vesting the sentencing
discretion in the judiciary rather than in parole
boards. Unless the parole boatd can be shown to

"See ILL. REV. STAT. ch 38, § 1003-5-1(a) (1975),
which lists several kinds of information required to be
included in an inmate's file.
"For a description of the sample see notes 44-50 and
accompanying text infra. In some of our analyses, we have
also used the correctional sociologists' prognoses as the
dependent variable. See Table VII and accompanying text
infra.
"In each case, bivariate associations will be presented
first. Since much of our data was ordinal, Kendall's Tau,
will be reported. While its maximum does not, for all
practical purposes, reach -L-1.00 and it lacks a substantively
meaningful interpretation, it does provide a test of significance that allows decisions to be made about whether the
pattern of distribution is likely to have occurred by chance.
For computation and interpretation see H. BLALOCK,
SOCIAL STATISTICS

319-24 (1960). Because the sample size

was too small to allow us to control for many variables by
physical manipulations, we used step-wise multiple regression to determine how different combinations of variables
explained the variance in parole board decisions. We realize
that there are problems associated with such procedures for
our data, but decided that it was important to make some
effort to pull the correlations together. We can report that
the tau,'s were within .05 of the simple Pearson r in all the
tests that were run. For a brief description of the procedure
see id. at 326-28. For particulars as to computation see
N. NIE, STATISTICAL PACKAGE FOR THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 345-59 (1975) [hereinafter cited as SPSS].
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have superior judgment about the significance of
those facts, the argument runs, we would do as well
to leave undisturbed the weight given them by the
judge when he imposed sentence. 3
Certainly included in the category of facts known
at the time of sentencing are those personal characteristics of the defendant that are little subject to
change or, as with age, change only inevitably and in
a highly predictable way. In addition to age, these
personal characteristics include sex, race and I.Q.
Personal circumstances and items of personal history
that are known at the time of sentencing but that are
subject to important modification during imprisonment include educational attainment, employment
history and marital status. Inmates may participate
in educational programs while in prison and may
significantly upgrade their achievement, some may
benefit from job training that would be useful in
securing employment on the outside, and many
inmates become divorced while in prison. Finally,
and quite importantly, the category of factors known
at the time of sentencing includes the defendant's
criminal record, both the current offense and any
prior record.
Factors that are determined only after sentencing
include, first of all, the length of the sentence itself.
If parole boards are influenced by the sentencing
judge's view of the seriousness of the offense or of the
intractability of the offender, then the boards might
take length of sentence as an indication of the judge's
sentiment. Similarly, the board might be influenced
by its own previous hearings and decisions on an
inmate's case. The post-sentence variable category
also includes, of course, those personal circumstances
mentioned above that are subject to significant
modification while in prison (education, job training,
and marital status) and what are referred to as the
inmate's "parole plans" -(whether the inmate has an
offer of employment during the parole period, and
whether the prospective parolee would be living
alone, with friends, with relatives, or with a spouse
and dependents-this is, of course, influenced by
marital status). Finally, this category includes two
sorts ofjudgments made about the inmate by officials
of the institution. The first of these are judgments
that the inmate has violated the prison's rules. The
Parole Board has before it the institution's record of
the inmate's disciplinary infractions, which are
classed as either "major" or "minor," and of the
penalties imposed. The second sort of institutional
" For a statement of the argument in favor of early fixing
of the release date, either determining it at the time of
sentencing or during the reception and diagnostic process
see MORRIS, supra note 3, at 34-50.

judgment made about the inmate is what is termed
his "prognosis." These judgments, which assess the
inmate's adjustment to prison and predict his likelihood of success after release, are made by two
separate sets of institutional employees: "reception
and diagnostic sociologists" who evaluate the offender as a part of the prison intake process, and
"correctional sociologists" (and/or "counselors")
who interview the inmate in the prison.
In the presentation of our findings, we first discuss
the variables known at the time of sentencing and
then those that are determined after sentencing. As
indicated above, to the extent that the parole decisions are determined by factors known before sentencing, the parole decision process may be argued to
be unnecessary. To the extent that post-sentence
variables appear to influence the parole decision, and
to the extent that it is thought to bejust or relevant to
take those variables into account in deciding when to
allow an inmate to re-enter society, parole decisions
would seem to have a legitimate place in the sentencing process. After presenting our findings from this
perspective, their policy implications will be explored
in Part II of this article.
Sample Characteristics.A professional, full-time

Parole Board consisting of nine members was established by statute in Illinois in 1969. 4 1 Members are
appointed by the Governor with Senate confirmation
and must have five years of experience in the
behavioral sciences related to the treatment of offenders. The length of term is six years, with the
possibility of reappointment. 4- Our analysis covered
three years, 1970-72; this was considered long
enough to provide a sufficient sample of cases and to
reflect the Board decision process that developed
after the 1969 reorganization. ""
The Master Record Files of the Illinois Department of Corrections, maintained in the Parole
Board's office and used as the basis of the Board's
decisions, were the source of our data. In the early
1970's, approximately 6400 adults were in prison in
44
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 1003-3-1(b) (1975). A tenth
member was added in 1973; see Act of July 26, 1972, Pub.
L. No. 77-2097, § 3-3-1, effectiveJan. 1, 1973.
41ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 1003-3-1(c) (1975).

"Illinois

is neither exceptionally "antiquated" nor

"reformist" in its parole program. Since Illinois changed
from a volunteer to a professional board in 1969, a study of
Illinois allows us to evaluate the performance of these new
professional boards. At the time of our study, the decision
procedure consisted of reading the master file and conducting a personal interview with each offender being considered for parole. Usually, three Board members interviewed
at a single institution for several days. At the end of each
day, the three members got together and decided the cases
reviewed that day. See interview files, supra note 39.
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Illinois at any one time. 41 The Parole Board office
maintained files on these persons and on 3100
parolees, as well as 2500 "dead files" (files on
inmates already discharged from their sentences). 48
A sample of 294 files was drawn.49 Forty-nine
and one-half per cent of the inmates in the sample
were black, 47.8 per cent white, and 2.8 per cent
Spanish surnamed. Just over 95 per cent of the
sample were male; 49 per cent were under twentyeight years of age. These proportions are similar
to those of the prison population as a whole. S"
Personal Characteristics

Race. In February of 1975, Governor Walker of
Illinois put forward a comprehensive package of
proposals for reform of his State's correctional
system. 5'The Governor's press release argued:
Parole affords no real safeguards to the public,
depends on vague rehabilitation standards for release
4
"'See Ill. Dep't of Corrections, Division of Research &
Long Range Planning, Population Analysis of the Illinois
Adult Prison System, December 31, 1972; Illinois Dep't of
Corrections, Division of Research & Long Range Planning, Adult Division-Population Statistics-Institutions
and Parole Supervision Services (1956 thru 1972).
" In 1970 the Parole Board reviewed nearly 9,000 adult

the juvenile cases. 1 ILL.

DEP'T OF CORRECTIONS ANN.

REP. 67 (1970).
49
Every sixtieth file was selected and then, on a second
run-through, starting from a different point, every 120th
file. Files, stored alphabetically, were rejected where no

decision was made during the period of the study. No
decision would have been made if either the person was not
yet eligible for parole or the person was released from his or
her sentence and had not yet been removed from the active
files. When a potential file showed no decision, the next file
was used and the count of sixty or 120 files then began
again from that new point. While we recognize that this
sampling procedure will not produce a true random sample,
simplicity and economy in the sampling and the difficulty in
supervising and controlling the individuals pulling the files
was thought to justify this sampling procedure. In any
event, we know of no plausible reason to suppose that the
sample would be systemtically biased in any significant way
by the resulting alphabetic stratification, and the sample
characteristics do seem to correspond quite closely to those
of the population as a whole.
"' For the prison population as a whole, the proportion
of blacks was 55.2 per cent on December 31, 1971, and 53.0
per cent on December 31, 1972. Ninety-eight and onetenth per cent were males during this period; 60 per cent
were under thirty years old. Puerto Ricans and Mexicans
appeared in the sample in such small numbers that, while
they were included in the analysis to assure completeness,
they will not be discussed separately. See Population Analysis of the Illinois Adult Prison System, supra note 47,
at 3,1 7, 12.
" See press release, supra note 5,at ad. 5.
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of prisoners, results in wide variations of time served
for identical offenses, [and] has tended to discriminate
against blacks ......
In examining the differences in parole rates accord-

ing to race, we found that 77.1 per cent of the whites
in our sample were paroled at their most recent
parole hearing, while the parole rate for the eight
inmates in our sample who had Spanish surnames
was 75 per cent, and the rate for blacks was 66.9 per
cent. As indicated in Table I, these differences in
parole rates are statistically significant. The findings
are not so clear cut, however, when we consider the
relationship between race and other aspects of the
inmates' records. Because of the interrelationships
between race and several of the other, "independent"
variables discussed below, especially the criminal
record and the prison disciplinary record, we will
defer further consideration of the possible effects of
race on the parole decision until we have presented
the data on these other variables. "
Sex. On the basis of the initial test, it appears that
males and females were not treated substantially
differently, but the sample included only fourteen
women and conclusions about sex differences are,
therefore, particularly tenuous. Consequently, a separate random sample of thirty-eight women's files
was drawn in order to examine more carefully the
paroling process with respect to women inmates. The
group in that sample represents 13 per cent of all
parole decisions made about women in 1970-72.
Because of its small size, we cannot argue for the
reliability of even this second sample. For what it is
worth, however, the factors affecting the parole
decisions do not appear to be appreciably different
for males and females, with one exception. The
disciplinary infraction rate at Dwight, the women's
prison, was similar to the rate for the general sample
for both major and minor infractions, but 21 per cent
of those at Dwight had lost good time while only 2.4
per cent of those in the general sample were so
severely penalized. There was, therefore, some evidence to suggest that administrative differences in the
institutions might lead to more negative disciplinary
records for women, which might be expected to make
it more difficult for them to win release. The parolegranted rate for the special subsample of women was
84 per cent, however, as compared to 72 per cent for
the men in the general sample.
Age. As shown in Table I, age appears to be a
relatively important predictor of board decisions.
Generally,
older inmates appear to be more likely to
5
1d. at ad. 4.
"5See text accompanying notes 94-104 infra.
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TABLE I

variance. 5 It appears that the intelligence measure,

PERSONAL CHARACTERISTICS AND BOARD DECISION'

therefore, may not in itself be an important criterion
in the Board's decisions.

Sig.

Tau,

Variable
2

.04
.38
.00
.03

.07
-. 01
.12
.10

Age
Sex'
I.Q.4
Race 5

Scoring:
= granted; two = denied
'One
2
Higher score = older (four-point scale)
3One = male; two = female
' Higher score = lower I.Q. (three-point scale)
'One = white; two = Spanish surname; three = black
be denied than younger ones; the relationship,
however, is not linear. Those who were in our oldest
category (over thirty-five years old) had a better
chance of being released than any group except those
under twenty-one. These findings suggest that the
board was likely to parole the youngest inmates,
presumably because they were expected to be more
easily rehabilitated, and the oldest ones, probably
because they were thought to have "burned themselves out" or "settled down."
L Q. Those inmates whose records indicated a
higher intelligence score were more likely to be
granted parole. The intelligence measure was also
associated with the correctional sociologist's
prognosis-the higher the score, the better the
5
prognosis. " We looked at the possibility, however,
that I.Q. score might in fact be a measure of some
other, more directly relevant factor. The intelligence
measure was found to be closely associated with race;
blacks in the sample were far more likely than whites
to have lower I.Q. scores. " I.Q. was also found to be
6
closely associated with pre-institutional education
and with prior offense record. " When we combined
these variables in a multiple regression analysis, the
intelligence measure explained very little additional
"Tau, = .11, sig. = .02.
5
Tau, = .29, sig. = .00. We do not suggest, of course,
that this correlation has any validity. A considerable
literature has developed indicating that serious validity
problems exist with respect to the scores of blacks on the
intelligence tests currently available; see, e.g., R. SANIUDA,
PSYCHOLOGICAL

TESTING

OF

AMERICAN

MINORITIES

(1975). One problem with having I.Q. scores recorded is
that they may be used as indicators of a person's "ability."
The high correlation between I.Q. and Board decision may
suggest that the scores influenced Board action. Further analysis indicates, however, that other considerations were
more important to the Board. See note 58, infra.
56
Tau, = .28, sig. = .00.

"Tau.. = .14, sig. = .01.

Pre-InstitutionalEducation & Employment. The
amount of education that an inmate had received

before entering the institution was significantly correlated with the parole decision. 6 Inmates who had
from six to eight years of education had a parole rate
of 68 per cent, while those who had attended high
school for any length of time had a parole rate in
excess of 75 per cent.
Stability in an inmate's pre-institutional employ"One-tenth of one per cent of the variance was explained. We used step-wise multiple regression to make a
further assessment of the contributions made to the parole
decision by various predictors. For a discussion of data
analysis problems see note 42 supra. We were able to explain 24 per cent of the variance with the following
variables:
Variable

Correctional Sociologist
Prognosis
Seriousness of Current
Offense
Number of Prior Convictions
Parole Plans-Employment
Seriousness of Infraction
Record
Institutional Education

R

R'

F-ratio
to
enter
or
remove

.40

.16

33.50

.00

.43

.19

5.30

.02

6.45
3.17
1.09

.01
.08
.30

1.14
.32
.22

.29
.57
.64

.14

.71

I.Q.
Pre-Institutional Work

Record
Race

.49

.24

Sig.

When we tried polynomial regression tests to build in

the interactions between race and various other decision
criteria, we were able to improve R' to .31, a 7 per cent
increase in the variance explained. The correctional sociologist's prognosis was still the most important predictor.
Race combined with number of prior offenses ranked
second, race combined with commitment offense and number of prior offenses was third, and marital status alone
ranked fourth. These four were the only variables that
had a significance level of .05 or better. As in the above
table, the top four variables in this equation explain 23
per cent of the variance.
'9We used .05 as a cut-off point for a significance test of
the F-ratio. I.Q.'s score was .57. For statistical interpretation of step-wise multiple regression and some limitations
on

its use see R. WONNACOTT

&

I.

WONNACOTT,

ECONOMETRICS 309-12 (1970); see also SPSS, supra note
42,6
0Tau, = .09, sig. = .01. The variable used a four point
scale: high school diploma or better, some high school, six
to eight years of education, and five years or less. The N in
this lowest category was only 16; the next smallest,
however, was 63.
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ment record had a highly significant correlation with
the parole decision, 6 but the nature of the inmate's
occupation did not. 62 Of the 241 inmates for whom
the files included information on employment history, 112, or nearly half, had not held a job for more
than six months; the parole rate for these inmates
was 66 per cent. Those who had worked for the same
employer for seven months or more had a parole rate
of 79 per cent. Using a standard occupational
classification including such categories as "professional," "clerical and sales,' "service," "farming,"
"machine trades," "structural work," and so on, the
pre-institutional occupations of the inmates were not
significantly correlated with the release decisions. "
Some of the rates may be of interest, however-the
twelve "professionals" in our sample had a parole
rate of only 50 per cent, for the twenty-three who
worked in " processing" the rate was 61 per cent and
for the forty-eight "structural" workers it was 65 per
cent, while fifty-four "service" workers had a rate of
72 per cent and eighteen who had worked in "clerical
and sales" had an 83 per cent rate.
CriminalRecord
Two characteristics of the inmate's criminal record
appear to have a significant influence on the Parole
Board's release decisions. Those factors are the
number of the inmate's prior convictions and the
seriousness of the commitment offense-i.e., the
offense for which the inmate is currently sentenced."
6

' Tau, = .12, sig. = .01. A six-point scale was used, the
"best" category being more than four years on the job, and
the "worst" being six months or less.
"Tau, = .05, sig. = .10. Nine standard occupational
categories were used.
"See note 62 supra. Since this was not necessarily an
ordinal scale, we might report that the chi square was also
not significant; sig. = .42.
'Offenses included in the "high" seriousness category
were all homicides, forcible rape, armed robbery, and
aggravated assault and battery. Those in the "medium"
seriousness category were burglary, unarmed robbery,
thefts (both vehicle and non-vehicle), forgery, other fraud,
and sex offenses. The only offenses included in the "low"
seriousness category for which persons in our sample were
in fact incarcerated were the narcotics law violations. In the
measure of seriousness of prior offenses, this category also
included alcohol law violations. These categorizations are,
of course, purely subjective or intuitive, and they might well
be quarreled with. The facts of individual cases might also
aggravate or mitigate the seriousness of an offense that falls
within any of these legal definitions. When we rank-ordered
sixteen specific offenses on a seriousness scale, the association with Board decision disappeared, suggesting that the
judgment about the nature of the offense was based on some
rather broad categories rather than finely tuned distinctions. Alternatively, the failure of the more refined measure
may indicate that individual mitigating factors reported in
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TABLE II
CORRELATION BETWEEN LATEST PAROLE DECISION' AND
CRIMINAL RECORD

Variable
2

Seriousness of Commitment Offense
Seriousness of Last Previous Offense 2
Number of Prior Convictions 3

Tau,

Sig.

.11
.01
.28

.03
.47
.00

Scoring:

'One = granted; two = denied
'One = least serious; two = medium; three = most
serious
3
One = none; two = one; three = two; four = three or
more
We also tested the association between the parole
decision and the seriousness of the last previous
offense committed by the recidivists in our sample,
but found that association was not significant. "'
Of the 294 inmates in our sample, 201 had at least
one prior, conviction on their records. The remaining
ninety-three first offenders had a parole rate of 91.4
per cent. For the fifty-three inmates with one prior
offense, the rate declined sharply to 66 per cent
granted parole; there was no further decline in the
parole rate for the sixty-three inmates with two prior
offenses (their rate was 66.7 per cent), but for the
eighty-five with three or more prior offenses the rate
declined to 58.8 per cent. On the seriousness of
commitment offense variable, the 126 inmates whose
offenses fell into the "high" seriousness category had
a parole rate of 67.5 per cent. For the 133 with
offenses of "medium" seriousness, the rate increased
to 75.2 per cent, and for the twenty-six with offenses
of only "low" seriousness the rate increased still
further to 84.6 per cent granted parole.
Length of Sentence and Time Served
The length of the sentence that the judge imposes
on an inmate might be taken by the parole board as
an indicator of the gravity of the offense, since the
judge presumably imposes sentence in light of all the
facts or evidence in the particular case, in addition to
the offender's prior record. Neither the maximum
nor the minimum sentences of the inmates in our
sample, however, were significantly associated with
the parole decision. "' Length of sentence does, of
the file are sufficient to blur the more narrow distinctions,
and the larger number of categories meant that the number
of cases in some of the categories was quite small.
"See Table I1supra.
"For maximum sentence, tau, = .06, sig. = .06 (fourpoint scale). For minimum sentence, tau, = .05, sig. = .12
(three-point scale).
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course, determine the point at which the inmate
becomes eligible for parole. Once that point is
reached, however, sentence length does not appear to
exercise significant further influence upon the release.
decision. The length of time served by the inmate
before the parole decision was also not significantly
associated with the parole rate. 6 Thus, the Board
apparently gives relatively little weight to the notion
that lengthy incarceration may embitter the inmates
and lead to increased rates of recidivism.
A related variable, which has an effect on the
length of time serVed before release and is also widely
believed to result in inmate bitterness toward the
penal system, is the number of parole hearings held
before the release decision. If the inmate is not
released at his initial hearing, when he first becomes
eligible for parole, then his case is continued for
several months to a year before it is reviewed again.
As with length of sentence and time served, we found
no significant difference in the likelihood that parole
would be granted at one stage of parole review rather
than at another. " This finding may reflect the fact
that most of the information in an inmate's file-including the number of prior offenses and the seriousness of offense, on which the Board apparently
places great weight-is unchanged from review to review. "'
Post-Release Plans
Another criterion for granting parole might be the
availability of environmental circumstances after
prison that are thought to make it less likely that an
ex-offender will commit new crimes. Such circumstances would include a job, family commitments, or
"stable" living arrangements. Table III shows the
relationship between post-release plans and the
Board decision. The findings indicate that the parole
decision was closely associated with such plans. A
promise of ajob or the presence of responsibilities in
a traditional family unit were likely to be associated
with positive Board action.
Several Board members in interviews, however,
expressed skepticism regarding the validity of the
inmates' employment plans. They felt that the
"jobs" were often illusory promises, made by family
or friends to facilitate release. Statements by persons
on the outside that they "were looking for" a job for
the inmate were particularly suspect." °
It is possible that the availability of a job was a
7
6 Tau, = .02; sig. = .30 (seven-point scale).
"Tau, = .01; sig. = .40 (three-point scale; at first
hearing, after one previous hearing, two or more previous
hearings).
"See
text acconipanying and following note 43 supra.
70
See interview files, supra note 39.

TABLE III
CORRELATIONS BETWEEN PAROLE DECISION' AND
POST-RELEASE PLANS

Post-Release Plans

Marital Status

2

Living Arrangements After Release'

Employment Plans 4
Dependents 5

Tau,

Sig.

.15

.00

.03

.23

.17
.10

.00
.01

Scoring:
'One = granted; two = denied
'One = married; two = separated or divorced; three =

single
I One = with family or friends; two = alone

'One = job found; two = returning to school; three =
no job or education planned
'High score = fewer dependents (five-point scale)
function of other variables and was not, in itself, an
important factor. Board members, for example,
expressed an awareness of the existence of racial
discrimination in employment. In our study, we
found that whites were more likely than blacks to
have a promise of employment, and the tendency was
statistically significant.' We also examined the
relationship between job plans and criminal record.
One might expect that those who had been convicted
of more serious offenses would have more difficulty
persuading potential employers to hire them, but this
was not the case in our data."7 Employment plans
did play a central role in the Board's decisions
regarding serious offenders, 7 although for those
with less serious offenses the job plans were not a
significant predictor. From these tests, it appears
reasonable to conclude that the Board takes employment plans into account in reaching its decisions.
This finding is consistent with what Board members
said, though it does not reflect the reservations that
some members expressed about the validity of the job
plans.
The importance of family responsibilities in shaping an individual's conduct can be seen in the close
association of the Board's decisions with marital
status and with number of dependents. When one is
"'Tau, = .08; sig. = .04.
.04; sig. = .20.

72Tau, =
3

" The association between parole decision and employment plans was tau, = .33, sig. = .00. In the multiple
regression analyses, employment plans rated high in explaining the correctional sociologists' prognosis, and in
explaining the parole decision when the prognosis was not
included as a predictor. Probably because of the high
correlation between job plans and prognosis, job plans
dropped out of the basic multiple regression model presented in note 58 supra.
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attempting to predict the inmate's likelihood of
returning to prison, attention to such personal
characteristics as marital status and family responsibilities may be understandable. In interviews with
the Board, however, most members said that marital
status played a relatively insignificant role in their
decisions. Our data suggest that, whether acknowledged or not, marital status is significant in explaining Board decisions.
Institutional Record
Education and Work Programs. Life within the

institution presents few opportunities for an inmate
to demonstrate a change in life-style that might
suggest rehabilitation. The prison's educational and
vocational training programs are among the few
such opportunities that are available. All inmates,
except those judged most dangerous, too old or ill
(about 5 per cent), or those engaged in full-time
educational programs (11 per cent), are expected to
perform some work, whether in the prison or in a
work release program. Slightly less than three-fifths
of the inmates had performed general work at the
institution (e.g., kitchen or laundry), slightly less
than one-fifth were employed in "correctional
industries" (such as a prison farm), and about five
percent were in work release programs.
The work record was significantly correlated with
neither the Board decision nor the correctional
sociologist's prognosis." Thus, it appears that neither the Board members nor the sociologists place
much faith in the rehabilitative effects of these work
programs-they do not seem to believe that the job
training received improves the likelihood of parole
success.
Both the Board and the sociologists, however,
were more impressed with evidence of a desire for
self-improvement through education. Slightly more
than half of the sample (54.8 per cent) had taken
some kind of education course work while in the institution, and participation in these programs improved an inmate's probability of release by almost
13 per cent. Of those who had had prison schooling,
78.4 per cent were released; of those who had not,
65.9 per cent were released. 7 Educational work may
be regarded as more salient than job training because Board members place special value on the
benefits of education, or it may be that the Board
believes that there is a higher degree of volun7

With Board decision, tau, = .02, sig. = .33; with

prognosis, tau, = .00, sig. = .33.

"With Board decision, tau, = .12, sig. = .00; with

prognosis, tau, = .18, sig. = .00.
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tariness in the inmate's decisions to participate in
educational programs than there is in work assignments. Thus, enrollment in educational programs
may reflect a self-selection process, and the Board
may regard this self-selection as an important indication of rehabilitative commitment. Alternatively,
participation in prison education programs may appear important in Board decisions because those
programs attract inmates who would be likely
candidates for parole in any event.
Disciplinary Infractions. Each violation of a
prison rule is categorized by correctional officials as
either a "major" or a "minor" infraction. 76 These
infractions include a wide variety of behaviors that
are unacceptable to prison officials ranging from not
getting up on time and not using dining room
equipment properly to insolence and fighting. Penalties are imposed at a very informal and quite brief
hearing held within the institution. The length of the
hearing and the degree of formality of the proceedings corresponds generally to the degree of seriousness of the infraction and of the contemplated
penalty. 77 A typical penalty for a "minor" infraction
might be, for example, a week's denial of recreational
"privileges," such as the use of athletic facilities.
Penalties for "major" infractions, by contrast, include revocation of good time, punitive segregation,
and the like. Only seven of 242 inmates for whom we
had information actually lost good time. " Almost
two-thirds had minor infractions, however, and
roughly half had major infractions recorded in their
files.
These disciplinary actions appear to play an
important part in the Board's decisions. The correlation between the disciplinary infraction record and
the Board's decision to grant or deny parole was
statistically significant."9 The association indicates
"ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 1003-8-7 (1975) and Ill.
Dept. of Corrections, Adm. Reg. §§ 803-07 (1973).
77See H. Hill, Disciplinary Hearings in the Illinois
Penitentiary System, 1973 (unpublished paper prepared for
Urban Criminal Justice Seminar, Northwestern University
Law School).
7'Women were, apparently, more likely to lose good
time. See text following Table I supra.
"Tau, = .16; sig. = .00. The summary measure of
infraction record, "seriousness of infractions," has four
values: no infractions, only minor infractions, only major
infractions, and both major and minor infractions. This
measure is appropriate as an indicator of the seriousness of
the infraction record for three reasons. First, there was a
high correlation between the number of major and of minor
infractions (taue = .33, sig. = .00). Second, the distributions for major and minor infractions show that there is an
underlying continuum. Two-thirds of the sample had minor
infractions. One-half had major ones, and those with the
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that having a record of both major and minor
infractions significantly reduced the chance of being
granted parole. While 77.6 per cent of the fifty-two
inmates with no infractions were released, only 60.7
per cent of the one-hundred and twelve who had both
major and minor infractions were paroled. " The few
who had lost good time were least likely to be
paroled; they had a parole rate of 42-9 per cent.
It appears, therefore, that the Board placed considerable weight on the judgments of misconduct
made by prison officials. This may raise a procedural
issue. Unless the Board members question the inmate about his disciplinary record during his parole
hearing, and we are informed that they do not
ordinarily do so,"' the Board has before it only the
Master Record File's listing of the inmate's infractions and the penalties imposed. Thus, the Board
members making a parole decision will ordinarily
not be informed of the inmate's version of the facts
of the disciplinary offenses, and the parole decision may, then, constitute the imposition of two
penalties for the same alleged misconduct without
ever affording the inmate an adequate hearing. The
first penalty, of course, is the sanction imposed by
the prison officials, and the second occurs when
the Board denies parole because of the inmate's
disciplinary record.
One explanation for the seeming importance of the
prison record may be a "bad apple" theory. It is
possible that it was not the rule infractions per se that
were determinative; rather, the prison record may be
viewed by the Board as reflecting a general inability
of the inmate to live by society's rules. This view
would suggest that those inmates who had committed
the most serious or most numerous offenses would
be more likely to have broken prison rules as- well.
Thus, the record of prison infractions may have
more serious infractions tended to have minor ones as well
(77 per cent). On the other hand, 42 per cent of those with
minor infractions had nothing more serious. Finally, the
measure of association between infraction measures and
parole decision was not significantly affected when dichotomies were used rather than quantities of infractions. The
correlation for parole decision and number of minor
infractions was .11 (sig. = .03). It was .09 (sig. = .01)
when we used a dichotomous measure, "any" minor
infractions versus "none." For major infractions, the
correlation was .17 (sig. = .00) for the number of
infractions, and .13 (sig. = .00) for the dichotomous
measure.
0

" For additional analysis of the effect of disciplinary
infractions upon the parole decision, controlling for race see
note 97 and accompanying text infra.
"See interview files, supra note 39.

TABLE IV
SERIOUSNESS

OF INFRACTIONS'

CRIMINAL RECORD,
CORRECTIONAL

PLACE

SOCIOLOGIST PROGNOSIS

Variable
2

Current Offense Seriousness
Institution 3
Seriousness Last Previous Offense
Maximum Sentence4
Number of Prior Offenses 5

Correctional Sociologist Prognosis 6
Scoring:

'High
2 One
serious
'High
'High
'High
6
High

CORRELATED WITH

OF CONFINEMENT AND

Tau,

Sig.

.11
.24
.08
.20
.07

.02
.00
.10
.00
.14

.20

.00

score = most serious record (four-point scale)
=least serious; two = moderate; three = most
scdre
score
score
score

=
=
=
=

houses most serious offenders
longer time (four-point scale)
more offenses (four-point scale)
most negative rating (five-point scale)

been seen as an additional indicator of the degree of
the inmate's threat to society. In order to test this
hypothesis, we looked at the association between
prison infractions, Board decision, and prior record.
Table IV presents correlations of the disciplinary
record with previous offenses and the prison evaluation process. There was a significant correlation

between the nature of the commitment offense and
the likelihood of having major infractions on one's
record. 2 In general, those who were in prison for the
more serious offenses were more likely to have
records of prison violations. This finding, then,
might be thought to support the "bad apple" theory.
A significant correlation also exists among the place
of confinement and the proportion of offenders who
had records of prison infractions. 8 Since assignment
to the prisons depends, to some extent, on the
seriousness of the offense, the fact that the maximum
security penitentiaries recorded more infractions
than the minimum security institutions may not seem
surprising. There is considerable variation, however,
even among the maximum security institutions. For
example, at Joliet, 30 per cent of the inmates in the
sample had major infractions on their records, while
57 per cent of those at Stateville had such offenses.
Seventy per cent of those at Pontiac had major
infractions, but at Menard the figure was only 44 per
2

Tau, = .18, sig. = .00; number of major infractions
correlated with seriousness of commitment offense.
83
Tau, = .24, sig. = .00; seriousness of infraction
record correlated with institution.
1
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12

cent."' Rules regulating prison behavior, as well as
the enforcement practices, were, for the most part,
under the control of the individual institutions. The
variation in infraction rates might be explained in
part, then, by differences among the institutions'
behavior standards, as well as by differences in the
behaviors themselves. Since infractions hurt one's
parole chances, the person in an institution that
records more infractions would seem to be more
likely to be denied parole than would otherwise be
the case. The parole rate, however, does not vary
significantly across the institutions; 85 this may
well be due to systematic variation in other characteristics of the institutions or of their populations, the
combined effect of which is to mask the significance of
the infractions variable. Thus, while the institution
by itself was not significant, the institutional disciplinary practices do appear to have some importance in
determining the board action.
An alternative explanation of the importance of
infractions to the Parole Board may lie in the
association between infractions and the correctional
sociologists' progonoses. As shown in Table IV, the
two variables are highly correlated. This association
is not surprising when one considers that the prognosis is based, at least in part, on the inmate's conduct
in prison. If an inmate develops a record of incorrigibility in prison, he will probably be seen as a likely
failure if released. Such a prognosis makes the
assumption that conduct when released may be
predicted on the basis of adjustment in prison-that
the social control mechanisms on the "outside" are
similar to those in the institutions. 6 Labeling theorists might suggest that the offender, being expected
to be a failure, is treated as such and acts, accordingly, to fulfill those expectations. 7
The role of infractions in parole board decisions
may, as has been noted, merely be to reinforce what
is already known about the offender, especially his
"In an interview, one Board member commented that
he did not put much weight on the infractions from Pontiac
because guards there were more intolerant than at other
places. See interview files, supra note 39. Pontiac also
received more of the younger prisoners, so that one might
expect greater discipline problems there because of more
behavior problems among younger offenders.
8
Tau, = .02; sig. = .38.
86

See note 123 infra.

"This is, specifically, what Lemert has called "secondary deviation." E. LEIERT, HUMAN DEVIANCE, SOCIAL
PROBLEMS & SOCIAL CONTROL 40-64 (1967) (ch . 3: The
Concept of Secondary Deviation). See also, e.g., H.
BECKER, OUTSIDERS: STUDIES
DEVIANCE (1963); E. SCHUR,

IN

THE SOCIOLOGY

OF

LABELING DEVIANT BEHAVIOR: ITS SOCIOLOGICAL IMPLICATIONS (1971).

TABLE V
CORRELATIONS OF INFRACTIONS AND PAROLE DECISION,'
CONTROLLING

FOR COMMITMENT

Number of Major Infractions

2

Controlling for Commitment Offense
Most Serious, N = 126
Moderate, N = 132
Least Serious, N = 25
Number of Minor Infractions'
Controlling for Commitment Offense
Most Serious, N = 126
Moderate, N = 132
Least Serious, N = 25

OFFENSE

Tau,

Sig.

.12
.19
.10

.09
.01
.26

Tau

Sig.

.12
.13
.05

.09
.06
.38

Scoring:
'One = granted; two = denied
2High score = more infractions (four-point scale)
'High score = more infractions (six-point scale)
criminal record. To test the possibility that rule
infractions are an independent predictor of board
decisions, however, we looked at the correlation
between infractions and the Board decision while
controlling for the seriousness of the commitment
offense. Table V shows the results of these manipulations.
Only for those with moderately serious offenses
(generally, crimes against property) did the infraction record help to explain the parole decision. " For
those with either very serious offenses (crimes of
violence) or minor offenses (mostly narcotics violations) the disciplinary record did not make an
independent contribution. The pattern may be explained by the hypothesis that, for those with the
most serious or with the most minor offenses, the
rehabilitative model may not operate. "Reformation" may be irrelevant for the serious offender, and
not "necessary" (or measurable) for the more minor
offender. For the intermediate category, however,
reform may be thought to be both necessary and
possible, and infractions may then be used as one
measure of the extent to which the inmate has
"adjusted."
Instztutional Predictions. Approximately one
month before the Board reviews an inmate's case, a
correctional sociologist goes over the record, has a
brief interview with the inmate, and records a
prognosis of post-prison success. The prognosis
reflects the institution's assessment of the likelihood
"In the regression analysis, the disciplinary infraction
record explained only one per cent of the variance in the
parole decision. See note 58 supra.
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TABLE VI

CROSS-TABULATION OF PAROLE DECISION AND CORRECTIONAL SOCIOLOGIST PROGNOSIS: PROPORTIONS OF EACH
RATING CATEGORY WHO WERE GRANTED, DENIED PAROLE

Unfavorable

Guarded

Doubtful

Problematic

Favorable

Total

Granted (N)
%

(1)
25.0

(18)
45.0

(58)
73.4

(58)
89.2

(24)
96.0

(159)
74.6

Denied (N)
%

(3)
75.0

(22)
55.0

(21)
26.6

(7)
10.8

(1)
4.0

(54)
25.4

Tauc= .38
Sig. = .00"

that the inmate will violate parole. The correctional
sociologist's report gives a brief description of the
inmate's pre-institutional history and conduct in
prison, and concludes with a paragraph stating the
sociologist's own assessment of the inmate's situation
and with a rating on a five-point scale of likelihood of
success.
The correctional sociologist's evaluation constitutes the institution's authoritative estimate of what
an inmate's prospects for success on parole would be.
Our findings indicate that the Board's actions corresponded quite closely to the sociologists' prognosis.
Table 1I shows the distributions. A rating of
"favorable" or "problematic" gave one a significantly greater chance of being paroled than a rating
of "guarded" or "unfavorable." (The labels used for
the prognosis categories are perhaps misleading since
four of the five categories seem to imply variations on
an unfavorable theme. The negative connotation of
most of the labels may permit the institutional
officials to "cover" themselves in the event of a
parole failure.)
Even with the very high degree of correlation,
however, it is difficult here to make the attribution of
causality, to infer that the Parole Board's decisions
are significantly influenced by the prognoses
(which, of course, the Board members do have before them at the time that they decide whether to
grant or to deny parole). It is possible that the correctional sociologists and the Board members independently reach similar conclusions because their
judgments are based upon the same record. Thus, if
past offenses, institutional disciplinary record, and
marital status, for example, are seen by both the
Board and the sociologists as the most important
determinants of parole success, then their respective conclusions might be expected to be similar.
To attempt to assess whether the prognoses had an
independent effect on the Board's decisions, we ran
multiple regression analyses with and without the

prognosis included. This procedure provided a test of
whether the prognoses accounted for variation in the
Board's decisions that was not explained by the other
hypothesized independent variables. When the only
variables included in our regression equation were
those measuring information known prior to sentencing, we accounted for 12 per cent of the variance in
Board decisions. When we added to these the variables dealing with prison record and release plans, but
without the prognosis, we were able to account for 18
per cent. When we added the prognosis, the explained variance was 24 per cent and the prognosis
became the most powerful predictor of those included
in the analysis."9 These findings suggest that the
prognosis did have an independent effect on the
decisions of the Board.
Given the significance of the correctional sociologist's prognoses, we might examine them somewhat
more closely. Table VII shows the variables that are
most closely correlated with the prognosis.'"0
An inmate who continues his or her education
while in prison is likely to receive a favorable rating
by the sociologist, perhaps because the sociologists
have confidence in the efficacy of these "rehabilitative" programs. Regardless of academic performance, which is not recorded in the file, the act of
enrolling in the courses is apparently regarded by
the sociologists as demonstrating that the inmate
has adopted accepted cultural values of self-improve"9The prognosis had an R2 of .16. Two other variables
had F-ratios lower than .05; these were the seriousness of
current offense, and the number of prior offenses.
9
The "receiving sociologist's prognosis," included in
the table, is made at the reception and diagnostic center at
the time that the inmate enters the prison. Thus, these
prognoses are somewhat more remote in time from the
parole decision than are the correctional sociologists'
prognoses, made in the prison, and we found the reception
prognoses to be missing from a few more of the files. The
two sets of prognoses follow the same form, and they are
quite highly correlated, as indicated by the table.
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TABLE VII
CORRELATES

OF CORRECTIONAL SOCIOLOGIST
PROGNOSIS'

Variable

Receiving Sociologist's Prognosis'
2
Number of Prior Convictions
Institution'
Seriousness of Infractions'
5
Institutional Education
Pre-Institutional Work Record'
Stage at Which Last Parole Decision Made 7
Seriousness of Last Previous Conviction'
Pre-Institutional Schooling'
Marital Status"
Parole Plans-Employment"
Current Offense'
Scoring:
IHigh
'High
'High
'High
'High
'High

score
score
score
score
score
Score

=
=
=
=
=
=

Tau,

Sig.

.42
.25
.24
.20
.18
.17
.16

.00
.00
.00
.00
.00
.00
.00

.15

.00

.12
.11
.10
.10

.01
.01
.02
.06

most negative rating (five-point scale)
more convictions (four-point scale)
least secure (seven institutions)
most serious record (four-point scale)
least work experience (six-point scale)
least work experience (six-point scale)

'One = first review; two = first continuance; three
second continuance or more
'One = least serious; two = moderate; three = most
serious
'High score = least education (four-point scale)
"One = married; two = separated or divorced; three =
single
" One = job approved; two = back to school; three = no
job

ment. In contrast to the attention given by the

sociologists to the educational programs, however,
vocational training did not correlate significantly
with the prognosis and, thus, is apparently not regarded as indicating the inmate's degree of rehabilitation.
Both the number of prior offenses and the seriousness of the last previous adult conviction make significant contributions to the prognosis. The seriousness of the present offense did not correlate with the
prognosis. The prognosis, thus, appears to weigh
evidence of recidivism more heavily than it does the
dangerousness of the current offense. It is not surprising that a previous record would have significant
weight for the sociologist's prognosis since it might
well be considered evidence that the inmate was a
bad risk. The inmate who has more than one conviction has already demonstrated an inability to
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learn his lesson-he has displayed resistance to
the rehabilitative process.
The sociologist's prognosis also took into account
the personal background of the inmate, probably
reflecting the notion that an inmate is, to a large
extent, a product of his community environment.
Hence, those with solid work and educational
records, or with obvious family responsibilities,
were more likely to be considered good risks."
The close association between the prognosis and a
record of prison rule infractions shows that the
sociologists were also using those rule violations as a
predictor of the post-release behavior. "The prognosis thus depends to some extent on the standards of
behavior that each prison sets up. As noted above,"
discipline policy varies across institutions, so that an
inmate who appears to be a serious discipline
problem at one institution might appear more amenable in another one. We should also note that the
sociologists are not making independent evaluations
as neutral observers. The sociologists are employees
of the Department of Corrections and might be
expected to share many of the organization's goals
and criteria for success. Thus, the weight given by
the sociologists in their prognoses to disciplinary
infractions and to institutional education might be
viewed as a response to institutional norms-that is,
it may reflect the institution's position on who the
"good" inmates are.
Race-Reconsidered
As noted above, there was a statistically signifi-

cant bivariate association between the race of the inmates and the parole release decisions. Further
analysis discloses, however, that there was also a
significant association between race and several of
the other, "independent" variables. Table VIII
summarizes the findings on some of these relationships. The interrelations between race and other

significant predictors of the parole decision raise, of
course, a problem in determining the independent
effect, if any, of race.
One way to approach this problem is to separate
the sample into homogeneous racial groups and to
analyze the associations between the other variables
and the parole decisions within each race. If one set
"The significance level of all three of these variables is
.01 or better. See Table IX infra.
92Seriousness of infraction record was significant at the

.00 level. See Table VII supra.
"See text accompanying note 84 supra.
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TABLE VIII

TABLE IX

CORRELATIONS OF RACE' WITH OFFENSE AND PRISON

CORRELATIONS, WITHIN RACIAL GROUPS, OF OTHER

RECORD

INDEPENDENT VARIABLES WITH PAROLE DecisiON'

Variable

Tau,

Sig.

2

.19
.10
-. 01
.02
.06
.15
.08

.00
.04
.40
.07
.13
.00
.04

Commitment Offense
2
Seriousness Previous Offense
Number of Prior Convictions 3
Pre-Institutional Work Record'
Correctional Sociologist Prognosis'
Seriousness of Infraction Record'
Parole Plans-Employment 7
Scoring:
I One = white; two = black
2

0One = least serious; two = moderate; three = most

serious
'High
'High
'High
'High
7

score
score
score
score

=
=
=
=

more convictions (four-point scale)
least work experience (six-point scale)
more negative rating (five-point scale)
more serious record (four-point scale)

One = job approved; two = back to school; three = no

job found
of criteria seem to determine the parole of whites and
another to control the release of blacks, then we
might conclude that there was, in effect, a different
paroling system for each of the two races. For the
most part, we found this not to be the case; Table IX
summarizes these findings. The number of prior
offenses, the availability of a job upon release, and
the correctional sociologists' prognoses remained
significant predictors of the parole decisions within
each racial group. The two exceptions are rather
interesting. The variables that lose their significance
when inspected within racial categories are seriousness of commitment offense for both races and the
disciplinary infraction record for whites.
The finding on the relationship between the parole
of white inmates and their disciplinary records is
difficult to interpret; the forty white inmates with no
infractions had a 75 per cent parole rate, the forty
with only minor infractions had a rate of 85 per cent,
and twenty-one with major infractions but no minor
ones had a rate of 95 per cent. Only when we reach
the poorest disciplinary record category, those with
both major and minor disciplinary infractions, does
the rate turn in the expected direction and decline
(sharply) to 61 per cent."' The results for the black
inmates are much more straightforward-a straightline decrease from a parole rate of 81 per cent 9" for
those with no disciplinary infractions to a rate of only
"The number in this category is 39.
"5 Number of cases = 26.

Tau.

Sig.

.22
.34

.00
.00

.06
.08

.21
.16

.16
.17

.01
.02

.09
.20

.13
.01

.29
.50

.00
.00

2

Number of Prior Offenses
Within whites
Within blacks
Seriousness of Commitment Offense'
Within whites
Within blacks
Post-Release Plans (Employment)'
Within whites
Within blacks
Disciplinary Infraction Record 5
Within whites
Within blacks
Correctional Sociologists' Prognoses '
Within whites
Within blacks

Scoring:
IOne = granted; two = denied
2 High score = more offenses (four-point scale)
3 High score = more serious (three-point scale)
' One = job approved; two = back to school; three
no job
High score = more serious (four-point scale)
High score = more negative (five-point scale)

=

58 per cent" for those with both major and minor
infractions. "
The seriousness of the commitment offense was
found to be significantly associated with the release
"Number of cases = 69.
'7 We can suggest some alternative hypotheses to explain
the different pattern for blacks and whites. Among the
whites, the associations between decision and the number of
major and minor infractions were not statistically significant, as was also the case with the "seriousness of
infractions" measure. The distributions suggest that, for the
whites, the weight given by the Board to the infraction
record was influenced by the intervention of some other
variable (or variables) that has so far eluded us. We tested
the hypothesis that the infraction record was associated
with the nature of the current offense. We found no such
association for the whites, but there was one for the blacks.
Apparently, the in-prison disciplinary behavior of whites is
not regarded as continuous with outside behavior, and is,
therefore, not used as a primary indicator of parole
readiness. (For whites, the correlation between commitment
offense and seriousness of infractions was -. 04, sig. = .29;
for blacks, it was .17, sig. = .01.) We also tested the
association between the correctional sociologists' prognoses
and infractions, controlling for race. For whites, the
prognosis was not associated with the infraction record, but
for the blacks it was. For whites, the correlation between
prognosis .and seriousness of disciplinary record was .14,
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decisions for the overall sample." 8 When we controlled for race, however, this association disappeared for both races. 9 9 The most likely explanation
for this result would seem to be that the quite high
degree of association between race and seriousness of
commitment offense'"' confounds the analysis of the
independent effect of either on the parole decision.
As further attempts to sort out these effects, we ran
two additional analyses. The first of these was, in a
sense, the other side of the coin of the analysis that
separated our sample into homogeneous racial
groups. In this analysis, we sorted the sample,
instead, into groupings that were homogeneous
according to each of the values of the criminal record,
disciplinary infraction, and prognosis variables-i.e.,
we sorted the inmates according to whether they had
no prior offenses, one prior offense, two prior
offenses or three or more prior offenses, and then
according to whether the seriousness of their commitment offense was "high," "medium," or "low" and
so on. We then analyzed the association between race
and the parole decision within each of those category
groupings. The correlation did not reach the level of
statistical significance in any of the value
categories. '01 The second of these further analyses
was a step-wise multiple regression that included

sig. = .06; for blacks, it was .24, sig. = .00. Perhaps, then,
the infraction record is interpreted differently for the two
races. For blacks, it is taken as another indicator of the
likelihood of recidivism; for the whites, the infractions may
be regarded as part of a more complex, individualized
prediction process, thus creating increased variability
within the categories and making the correlations weaker.
An alternative hypothesis might be that the racial differences in infraction effects are a function of the distribution
qf criminal offenses. Accordingly, because whites as a group
had better criminal records than blacks, the whites were not
so needful of a good infraction record-their lesser offenses
might mean that the board would be less concerned with
whether the whites had become "rehabilitated."
Because of the number of cases needed to complete a
four-way control (decision, infraction, offense and race), we
cannot evaluate these hypotheses directly. Much of this
discussion illustrates the dilemma-for both substance and
method-that is presented by multicollinearity. For others'
efforts see Jackman, A ANote on Intelligence, Social Class,
and PoliticalEfficacy in Children, 32 J. POLITICS 984, 986
(1970).
98
See Table II supra.
99
For blacks, tau,= .08, sig. = .16; for whites, tau,=
.06, sig. = .21.

'See Table VIII supra.
"' 1The statistic used here is chi square. All of these
correlation matrices are simple, four cell, two-by-two
tables-the parole decision, granted or denied, by race,
white or black. If tau, were used instead, the black-white
difference would reach the .05 level of significance in four of
the value categories: the "medium" category of commit-
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race along with a number of the other major
predictor variables. In that analysis, race explained
very little additional variance in the parole rate. 10'
On the basis of these analyses, it appears to us that
there is very little good evidence to support the
proposition that the Parole Board's decisions were
racially biased.
On the other hand, it is certainly true that there
are rather large differences between the parole rates
of blacks and whites, even within some of the value
categories. For example, if we eliminate first offenders and look only at the inmates with prior
offenses on their records, we find that whites with
prior offenses have a parole rate of 73 per cent, while
blacks with prior offenses have a parole rate of only
56 per cent. And if we look at the "parole plans
-employment"
variable, we find that blacks who
have no jobs promised to them on the outside have a
parole rate of 59 per cent, while whites with no job
have a 71 per cent rate; for those with jobs promised,
the rate for blacks is 76 per cent and for whites it is
87 per cent. With a few exceptions, "53 the parole rate
within the categories is consistently higher for whites
than for blacks. What our statistical analyses discussed above reflect, however, is that the effect of race
on the parole decision is inseparable, at least in a
sample the size of ours, from the effect of differences
between the records of whites and blacks. 1' As a
more concrete illustration of the magnitude of those
differences, consider that while 57 per cent of the
blacks in our sample fell into the "high" seriousness

ment offense seriousness (tau. - .12, sig. = .05; X = 2.14,
sig. = .14; N = 48 black, 84 white); the "one prior
offense" category (tau, = .25, sig. = .02; X 2 = 2.87, sig.
= .09; N = 29 black, 23 white); the "two prior offenses"
category (tau, = .28, sig. = .02; X' = 2.88, sig. = .09; N
= 28 black, 19 white); and the "major only" disciplinary
infractions category (tau, = .29, sig. = .01; X 2 = 3.33, sig.
= .07, N = 11 black, 21 white). In the other two offense
seriousness categories, the other two prior offense categories, the other three infraction categories, and all of the
prognosis categories, race was not significant by either
tau. or chi square.
2
..
See note 58 supra.
"'The exceptional categories, where the parole rate is
higher for blacks than for whites, are all at the "good" or
"favorable" end of the scales. They are the "low" seriousness of commitment offense category, the first offender
category, the category of those with no disciplinary infractions at all on their records, and the category of those with
the "best" or most favorable prognoses. Thus, to be candid
(if cynical), it appears that blacks who have been very, very
good may be given a break by the Parole Board. (But recall
that none of these differences is large enough to reach the
.05 significance level.)
.'.
See also note 97 supra.
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of commitment offense category, only 29 per cent of
the whites were in that category.
The differences in the parole rates of blacks and
whites, therefore, seem less likely to reflect racial
bias on the part of the Parole Board than to be due to
more fundamental differences either in the behavior
of blacks and whites or in the treatment of them by
society at large (including, e.g., employers) and by
institutions and officials who control earlier stages of
the criminal justice system. All of the differences in
the criminal and disciplinary records of blacks and
whites involve judgments made by several levels of
officials, frequently with a very high degree of discretion. Since there is effectively no external review
of prison disciplinary proceedings, for example, the
finding that blacks are more likely to have rule
infractions on their records may be as much a result of selective perception or discrimination on the
part of prison officials as it is of actual differences in
behavior. It may also be that police and prosecutorial
discretion result in more serious charges being
pressed against blacks; conversely, whites may be
more likely to get their charges reduced through plea
bargaining. A white accused, with more readily
available or perhaps higher quality legal representation, may thus end up with a lesser charge, a shorter
sentence, fewer disciplinary infractions, and consequently, a better chance at parole.

previous hearings on this parole decision,"' with the
inmate's prison work assignment or participation in
vocational training programs, "' nor with the sex of
the inmate. "' Whether the inmate's race has an
independent effect on the parole decision is, in our
opinion, highly problematic. "' The research on the
determinants of post-institutional success, as measured by recidivism or parole revocation rates,
indicates that success is correlated with past record, 9 age,'2 family situation,"12 and employment prospects, ' all of which the Board does take
into account. But the parole prediction literature also
indicates that institutional disciplinary infractions
have little, if any, significant association with parole
success, "' and the emphasis that the Board appears
"'See text accompanying notes 68-69 supra.
"'See text accompanying note 74 supra.
'"See Table I and accompanying text supra.
"'See Tables I, VIII, and IX and notes 51-53, 94104, and accompanying text supra.
"'See D.

GLASER, THE EFFECTIVENESS OF A PRISON

AND PAROLE SYSTEMI 49-51 (1964).
20Id. at 36-41.
"'Id. at 379. Glaser reported that residing with a
spouse is a positive factor, while residing alone is a negative
one.
12Id. at 359-61. Glaser reported that employment after
release is significantly associated with parole success, but
that it does not further improve the success rate if the job is
obtained before release from prison.
121Id. at 297-98. Glaser reported that prison "adjustSummary of Findings
ment"
may be a positive factor for inmates who are repeat
Our findings indicate that the decisions of the Iloffenders, but he noted that other investigators have
linois Parole Board are associated with the serious- generally not found this to be a significant predictor. In an
ness of the inmate's commitment offense, " with influential, rather early work, Lloyd Ohlin observed:
the number of prior offenses, "'"with participation in "Among criminologists it is generally recognized that the
educational programs while in prison, "' with the professional and more sophisticated criminal types adjust
inmate's record of infractions of the prison's rules, 108 well to prison rules and regulations. On the other hand,
many offenders who find it difficult to adjust to prison life
with his or her prospects for employment after retain some of the qualities most necessary to adequate
release, 109 with marital status and number of de- adjustment in the free community." L. OHLIN, SELECTION
pendents, 11 with age, 11I and (perhaps) with mea- FOR PAROLE 93 (1951). In a more recent work, O'Leary
sures of intelligence. 12 On the other hand, we found and Glaser reported data that indicate that the relationship
between parole success and institutional adjustment, if any,
no significant correlation of the parole decision with is certainly not a simple, linear relationship. Data cited
the seriousness of the prior offenses,"' with the from Minnesota indicate that, while parolees with no
length of the sentence the inmate was serving (either disciplinary infractions had a violation rate of only 43 per
maximum or minimum), 14 with the number of cent, as against a 54 per cent rate for those with one or two
infractions, when parolees had three or more infractions the
"'See Table II and accompanying text supra.
rate declined again to 49 per cent. Similarly, federal data
106d.
cited by O'Leary and Glaser indicate that parolees with
7
" See text accompanying note 75 supra.
little or no infraction on their prison records had reimpri...
See text accompanying notes 76-87 supra.
sonment rates of 30 to 34 per cent, parolees with a record
"'9See text accompanying Table III and notes 70-73 of only minor infractions had a reimprisonment rate of 53
supra.
per cent, but, for those with records of assault infractions,
"'See Table III and accompanying text supra.
the reimprisonment rate declined slightly to 51 per cent,
and for those with records of "serious deception" infrac"'See Table I and accompanying text supra.
"'See Table I and text accompanying notes 54-59 tions the rate declined much more to 44 to 45 per cent.
supra.

"'See Table II and text accompanying note 65 supra.
"'See note 66 and accompanying text supra.

O'Leary & Glaser, The Assessment of Risk in ParoleDe-

cision Making, in THE FuTURE OF PAROLE 135, 158 (D.
West ed. 1972) [hereinafter cited as O'Leary & Glaser].
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to place upon the institutional disciplinary record (at
least for the black inmates), 124 therefore, probably
serves to decrease the success rate of its parole
selection process-i.e., it probably means that the
Board is not selecting the candidates most likely to

of these, again, is quite clearly the prognosis.
Whether this means that the Parole Board has a
legitimate place in the sentencing process is considered further in Part II.

succeed on parole. 125

Our most striking finding, however, was the very
strong association between the Parole Board's decisions and the official predictions or "prognoses"
about an inmate's future behavior that are recorded
by correctional sociolboists within the institutions. 126
From a policy standpoint, this finding raises important issues. The weight given in parole decisions both
to the sociologists' prognoses and to prison disciplinary infractions may be viewed as delegating to
institutional officials or employees an important
portion of the power to determine length of sentence.
Thus, the effect of the Parole Board's decisions may
be to legitimate and give further consequence to the
labels attached to the inmate in the institutional
setting. One might well question whether it is
desirable for the Parole Board's discretion to be
delegated to quite junior employees of the Department of Corrections, some of whom may be poorly
qualified, and who make their decisions at a low level
of visibility without any sort of mandatory, regularized procedures. Some of these policy issues are
addressed in Part II of this article.
In each of the three categories of institutional
record-education and work program participation,
disciplinary infraction record, and prognosis-we
found correlations with the parole decision that
ranged from moderate to quite high levels of significance. This means, of course, that much of the
information that the Board apparently considers
relevant in making its release decisions is not known
at the time of sentencing, but rather arises from the
interaction between the inmate and the institution.
Other post-sentence variables that appear to have
significant impact on the Board's decisions are those
in the "parole plans" category. Thus, we conclude
that Illinois parole decisions have in fact been based,
at least in important part, on variables that are not
known at the time of sentencing-the most important
4

See note 97 and accompanying text supra.
12. After reviewing the evidence discussed in note 123,
supra, O'Leary and Glaser concluded: "If prison conduct
becomes the major factor in parole decisions, the functions
of parole other than regulating conduct in prison will be
sacrificed." O'Leary & Glaser, supra note 123, at 160.
Institutional discipline may, of course, be one of the values
that the parole system is intended to serve. See note 147,
infra; note 39 supra.
12
See Tables VI and VII, and notes 89-93 and
accompanying text supra.
"
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PART II: PAROLE AS AN ELEMENT OF
SENTENCING

POLICY

The Cost of Individualization
The
parole
can, I,
judges,

problem with parole is not so much that
boards cannot predict dangerousness. No one
but someone is going to be required tojuries, jailers, or someone-so long as we

continue to individualize the treatment of offenders.
The more serious problem, rather, is that a system
premised on the individualization of justice 2 '
unavoidably conflicts with a caseload that demands
simple decision rules. A decision-maker with unlimited, unstructured discretion cannot handle many
cases. To process their caseloads, parole boards
find it necessary to develop a routine, to look for one
or two or a few factors that will decide their cases for
them. 12' The factor may be the seriousness of the
offender's crime or the nature of his past record or
some rough, subjective combination of the two. Or
the board may decide, de facto, to delegate its discretion to someone else-to a diagnostic sociologist,
to a warden, or to the sentencingjudge.
If this routinizing or delegation of discretion does,
in fact, occur, it might be preferable simply to leave
the discretion, openly and clearly, with the sentencing judge. We would, then, at least know who
had the discretion. We would eliminate the current
diffusion of responsibility, which may lead to what
has been termed the "Private Slovik effect" ' when responsibility is diffuse, no one has to face the
full implications of his decision. Of course, this may
cut either way. Norval Morris has observed that
"one latent purpose of the division of power between
judge and parole board is to give the possibility of
some clemency while appearing in the public eye to
7

11

128

See text accompanying notes 175-79 infra.
See

N.

WALKER,

SENTENCING

IN

A

RATIONAL

SOCIETY 118-19 et seq. (1969).
29

' James Q. Wilson reports that the twelve members of

the New York State Parole Board have jurisdiction over
more than twenty thousand inmates and notes the tendency
of such caseloads to lead to the adoption of "rules of
thumb." J. WILSON, THINKING ABOUT CRIME 171-72
(1975). See also DAVIS, supra note 38, at 127, reporting

that the Federal Parole Board made about 15,000 parole
decisions per year or "an average of about fifty per working
day."
...
J. Newman, Foreword, YALE L.J., supra note 8, at
812-13.
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be imposing a more severe punishment." 13 ' As
Morris goes on to acknowledge, however, it is
problematic whether judges are more or less likely
than parole boards to be susceptible to public or
political pressure."
And, in spite of the common state of judicial
dockets, it may even be that judges are as likely as
parole boards to be able to provide individualized
justice. At least in serious felony cases (the sort of
case that is likely to result in imprisonment), the
trial judge, properly provided with staff to prepare
presentence reports, ' may be likely to devote as
much time and serious attention as would a parole
board or a correctional sociologist to the full range of
the individual offender's characteristics.
In the present state of the world, however, it seems
rather ingenuous to talk about "individualized"
sentencing. We know that most sentences are now
determined by plea bargaining between prosecutor
and defense counsel. 134 To opt for "judicial" sentencing rather than parole board decisions is, therefore, to opt for sentencing by plea bargain. The
standardized plea bargain, an efficient process that
usually takes no more than a few minutes as it is
practiced by "courthouse regulars," 135 is, in fact, the
most important method by which we now routinize
sentencing discretion and circumvent the individual
treatment ideal.
15

'MORRIS,

supra note 3, at 48.

"'See Report of the Chicago Bar Association Commission on Administration of CriminalJustice in Cook County,
Program for Action 185 (1975). This report notes that,
though the Illinois Code of Corrections requires presentence reports in all felony cases unless waived (ILL. REV.
STAT. ch. 38, § 1005-3-1 (1975)), the reports are in fact
used in only a small percentage of Cook County felony
prosecutions.
3 4

1 The seniorjudge of the Criminal Division of the Cook
County Circuit Court was quoted as having said in
testimony before the Illinois House Judiciary Committee:
In the event the courts are prevented from entering
plea bargaining, which now disposes of 90 percent of

cases, and we are compelled to try these cases, we

would be confronted with utter chaos.
Statement of Hon. Richard J. Fitzgerald, Circuit Judge,
Chicago Sun-Times, Sept. 24, 1975, at 58, col. 1. See also
A. BLUMBERO, CRIMINAL JUSTICE (1967); MORRIS, supra
note 3, at 50-51; Nqwman, Pleading Guilty for Considerations: A Study of Bargain Justice, 46 J. CRiM. L.C.

& P.S. 781 (1956). Plea bargaining is reported to be much
less common and has less official sanction in the federal

system than in most state systems. There is also, of course,
considerable variation among the states and among localities within the states in the extent and type of plea bar-

gaining.
3

Nardulli, The Court Organization. An Organizational Analysis of the Felony Disposition Process in
1

Chicago, June 1975 (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation,

If we were willing to abandon the individualization of justice, as modern criminologists have now
largely abandoned the rehabilitative ideal that depended upon individual treatment, "I we might
consider adopting mandatory, determinate sentences

set by the legislature. That is, each type of crime
would carry a definite, legislatively required sentence. Rape, for example, might be punished by eight
years in the penitentiary without (at least in the
purest form of the model) any possibility of probation
or parole. ' The difficulty, of course, is that giving
the same sentence for all rapes would be likely to
conflict with our notions of justice. It is rape if the
assailant compels the victim t6 submit by the use of
force that is violent, abusive, humiliating, and physiNorthwestern University); Rosett, The Negotiated Guilty
Plea, 374 ANNALS 71 (1967), reprinted in L. RADZINOwicz

& M.

OF THE LAW

WOLFGANG,

THE CRIMINAL

IN THE ARMIS

436, 437 (1971); Sudnow, Normal Crimes:

Sociological Features of the Penal Code in a Public
Defender Office, 12 SOCIAL PROBLEMS 255, 258-64 (1965).
See also J. EISENSTEIN & H. JACOB, FELONY JUSTICE ch. 6
(to be published 1976).
3
'See, e.g., sources cited at note 7 supra.
"'We should note the distinctions between some of the
things that are called determinate or "flat" sentencing. The

terms are sometimes used to refer to a system of fixed
sentences for the individual and at other times to refer to
fixed sentences for each type or category of crime. In the
former system, the sentencing judge tailors the sentence to
the individual offender, but it is not variable thereafter; in
the latter, the legislature determines the sentence for broad

categories of offenders or offenses. Since probation, parole
and "good time" all give some decision-maker other than
the legislature power to mitigate the individual offender's
sentence, they are to that extent inconsistent with legislative
sentencing; since parole and good time decisions are made
subsequent to the initial imposition of sentence, they are
inconsistent, as well, with the former meaning of determinancy. If the possibility of probation does not exist, the
concept also then includes, of course, mandatory imprisonment.
In his June 19, 1975, message to Congress dealing
generally with the subject of crime, President Ford called
for mandatory imprisonment for several types of offenders

and observed, in the same breath, that "it may be time
to give serious study to the concept of so-called 'flat-time
sentencing' in the Federal law." 121 CONG. REC. S11020
(daily ed. June 19, 1975) (remarks of President Ford).
The package of corrections proposals recently put forward by Governor Walker of Illinois would abolish parole,
but would permit probation for most offenses (though it
would be called "mandatory supervision," instead) and
would retain and expand good time. (With abolition of
parole, good time credits would assume additional importance as the prime incentive mechanism in the control of
institutional discipline.) See press release, supra note 5;

Illinois Law Enforcement Commission, Synopsis-Justice
Model Legislation, mimeo memorandum distributed in
early 1975 (describing legislation necessary to implement
Walker proposals).
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cally dangerous; it is also rape to have intercourse
with a woman who is unable to consent because she
has become unconscious or insensible through her
own, voluntarly use of alcohol or drugs. "' Both may
be culpable, but one is likely to be regarded more
gravely than the other. To rely on prosecutorial
discretion to provide differentiation in the treatment
of these very different cases would be neither safe nor
principled-it would, in fact, be to admit the need to
import individualized justice back into the system.
Therefore, we seem likely to retain, through some
procedure, a considerable measure of individualization in the treatment of offenders. There are additional reasons, which we have not yet noted, why this
is so. As Caleb Foote has pointed out, for example,
individualization makes possible an indefiniteness in
sentencing that is functional because it permits the
system to adjust the size of prison populations. ' At
a time when the number of crimes is increasing faster
than the number of prison cells, the system wants
sufficient flexibility to permit it either to punish a
smaller percentage of the crimes by imprisonment or
to reduce the average length of sentence. (Regardless
of the amount of overcrowding that one is willing to
tolerate, the capacity of every warehouse has some
limit.) Parole is one of the devices used to provide this
population flexibility.
For these reasons and, perhaps not least, because
the parole system employs a considerable number of
persons who have better than average access to the
political decision-makers, 140 parole seems likely to
continue to be one of the types of individualized
treatment that we will retain. Given that likelihood,
we might wish to consider whether parole is as much
of a disaster as its critics contend.
Handling the Caseload
One of the propositions on which our conclusion
rests is that caseloads are never so small nor the
decision-making manpower so great that one can
afford to ignore decision costs. That is, parole boards
will always have an incentive to dispose of each case
at minimum cost. (Decision costs, of course, include
such things as time, money and energy.) To achieve
this cost minimization, there are at least two strategies that we have noted that parole boards can adopt:
18 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Burke, 105 Mass. 376
(1870); ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 38, § 11-1 (a) (1) & (2) (1975).
1"'Foote,
The Sentencing Function, in A PROGRAM FOR
PRIsoN REFORM 17, 18, 19, 23 (1972) (final report of the
Annual Chief Justice Earl Warren Conference on Advocacy, June 9-10, 1972, published by Roscoe PoundAmerican Trial Lawyers Foundation).
...Cf. MORRIS, supra note 3, at 36.
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delegation of the discretion to some other decisionmaker, or the use of simple, efficient, "automatic"
decision rules. Let us consider each of these strategies
and its implications somewhat further.
If the parole board delegates the discretionary
decision to a "correctional sociologist" or similar

functionary, the individualization of treatment may
be maintained-the sociologists may (or may not)
arrive at their decisions or "prognoses" on an individualized basis-but delegation will almost certainly mean that the exercise of the discretion will be
less visible and therefore less subject to review, that
the standards used in the decision will be even more
indefinite and inconsistent, that the inmate will
therefore be less likely to have notice of what the
standards are, and that the procedures used in
reaching the decisions will be lacking in almost all
the attributes of due process. Delegation to the
warden and his deputies, by resting the parole
decision on the inmate's institutional disciplinary
record, is scarcely more satisfactory. The prison
disciplinary decisions may be somewhat more visible
to the inmate than are the sociologists' prognoses, but
the scope of review of those decisions is also quite
limited and the procedures are, at best, required to
adhere to only rudimentary due process."1 Moreover, the literature indicates that the prison disciplinary record is a relatively poor predictor of parole
success or future crimes. 4' A final possibility is
delegation of sentencing discretion back to the sentencing judge-either by formally divesting the
parole boards of the discretion and decreeing that the
judicial decision will be final, "4' or by the parole
boards deferring to the sentencing judges' views as to
appropriate length of sentence, whether those views
are communicated by explicit statements or by
informal cues. We have already discussed some of the
pros and cons of an increased role for judicial
sentencing, and we give below an additional reason
for our conclusion that it is probably not preferable
to parole board decision-making. 144 Before returning
to the judges, however, let us consider the second
broad type of strategy for efficiency in the disposition
of cases-simple or "automatic" decision rules
under which only a few variables, rather than the full
panoply of the offender's characteristics, determine
the outcome of the decisions.
41
1 See,

e.g., Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974);
Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778 (1973); Morrissey v.
Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972).
.4 See note 123 supra.
143 See, e.g., press release, supra note
5; YALE L.J.,

supra note 8, at 897-98.
14See

text accompanying notes 188 & 205 infra.
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Simple decision rules obviously conflict with the identified as sharing with other groups or categories
desire for individualized judgments. They are the of persons whose record of behavior in similar
antithesis of a discretionary, subjective assessment of circumstances is known; typically, the list of characall the known circumstances of each individual case.
teristics or amount of personal information taken
Because of caseload pressures, however, such deciinto account in this type of prediction will not be as
sion rules are likely to evolve, de facto, even if extensive. This sort of prediction is termed "actuarial," "categoric," or "statistical." 150
individual treatment is declared to be one of the
formal values of the system. If this is so, we think it
We now reach another proposition that is essential
clearly preferable that the rules be openly declared to the argument of our conclusion-that actuarial
and, thus, potentially subject to review, as are the predictions are likely to be more accurate in predictFederal Guideline Table and Salient Factor Score. " " ing dangerousness than are clinical predictions. This
Like the Salient Factor Score, these decision rules are proposition, apparently, is somewhat controverlikely to be formulae intended to predict future sial,'5' but our review of the literature leads us to
dangerousness. Regardless of our lack of success in conclude that it is supported by the great weight of
the enterprise to date, the prediction of risk is,
scientific evidence. 112 This is fortunate, for actuarial
without much doubt, the most important responsibil- predictions may be made at a smaller decision cost
ity vested in parole boards. 46 The boards are than clinical predictions, and actuarial predictions
charged by statute with taking other factors into are thus more consonant with the need to dispose
account, such as the effect of their decisions on
of the caseload at minimum cost. Actuarial predicgeneral public respect for the law and on prison tions are more akin to automatic decision rules; e.g.,
discipline and morale, 147 but these factors are even
we say that persons who have been convicted for two
more subjective and less quantifiable than is risk, and or more crimes in the past, who have no job or stable
it seems safe to assume that both the boards and the family relationships, and who are under age twentypublic are most concerned with discriminating
five are likely to be poor risks. If the decision-maker
among the inmates according to what is believed to takes into account not only these characteristics of the
inmate, but also attempts to assess the 'inmate's
be their potential for further harm to society.
attitude or "adjustment" or outlook on life, or to
What Sort of Prediction?
determine whether the inmate has reformed or
Now, acknowledging once again that none of our
become rehabilitated, or the decision-maker otherpredictions of dangerousness is likely to be very good, wise tries to develop a "feel" for the inmate, the
it may yet be that some kinds of them are more prone
evidence, we are happy to note, is that his predicto error than others. A distinction is sometimes
tion is not likely to improve. It is, instead, likely to
drawn between two types of predictions that are
"°Id. Though the distinction between these types of
relevant here. 14 The first type is based upon prediction is terribly vague at the margins-all the predicobservation and evaluation of the personality and tions are, after all, based on observation of the past behavior
past behavior of an individual, taking into account an of the subject and of persons thought to be similar in some
open-ended list of his personal characteristics, some respect to the subject-the distinction is well-known and
widely observed in the literature, and it does describe a
of which may be quantified or quantifiable and difference in approach that is, at least as it approximates
others of which may be entirely subjective-these the polar types, quite real and significant. See Sawyer,
are termed "clinical," "case study," or "anamnes- Measurement and Prediction, Clinical and Statistical, 66
tic" predictions. 149 The second type is based upon PSYCHOLOGICAL BULLETIN 178 (1966) [hereinafter cited as
characteristics that the individual can be clearly Sawyer]. See generally P. MEEHL, CLINICAL VERSUS
[hereinafter cited as
STATISTICAL PREDICTION (1954)
'1"See text acconjpanying notes 22-26 supra. On the MEEHL].
"'See, e.g., MORRIS, supra note 3, at 32. For a
importance of reviewability see generally DAvis, supranote
thorough review and analysis of the literature available
38.
146 One of the authoritative works in the field concludes
through the early 1960's, written from a point of view fathat "the principal consideration in the decision to grant or vorable to the clinicians, see Gough, Clinical versus Stadeny parole is the probability that the inmate will violate tistical Prediction in Psychology, in PSYCHOLOGY INTHE
the criminal law if he is released." R. DAWSON, SENTENC- MAKING 526, 562-68 (L. Postman ed. 1964).
ING:

THE DECISION AS TO TYPE, LENGTH, AND CONDI-

263 (1969).
147See,
e.g., 18 U.S.C. §§ 4202-03 (1970); ILL. REV.
STAT. ch. 38, § 1003-3-5 (c)(2)&(3) (1975).
14'A third possible type, "intuitive" predictions, need
not concern us. See MORRIS, supra note 3, at 32.
1"Id. at 31-34.
TIONS OF SENTENCE

152

See generally MEEHL, supranote 150, at 83, 90-119

(ch. 8: Empirical Comparisons of Clinical and Actuarial
Prediction); J.

WIGGINS, PERSONALITY AND PREDICTION

181-222 (1973) (ch. 5; Clinical versus Statistical Prediction) [hereinafter cited as WIGGINS]; Meehl, Seer over Sign:
The First Good Example, 1 J. EXPERIMENTAL RES. IN
PERSONALITY 27 (1966); Sawyer, supranote 150.
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become less accurate. "Happy" because, were this
not so, our dilemma would be even more severe.
Given the pressure to dispose of cases by simple,
cheap decision methods, actuarial predictions are
more likely to be used than are truly clinical predictions. It is some comfort to think that speed and ease
in the disposition of cases need not be purchased at
the cost of less accuracy in prediction, and therefore
of less safety to the public.
But there is a substantial body of opinion, particularly in the academic community, to the effect that no
prediction of dangerousness, whether actuarial or
clinical, should be used as a basis for sentencing. 153
The contention, generally, is that neither sort of
prediction is accurate enough to rely on without
sacrificing safety and/or justice-and there should be
no doubt that both safety and justice are at stake in
the use of these predictions. If error in the prediction
causes a harmless person to languish in prison
unnecessarily, that will probably be thought to be
unjust. If error in the prediction causes a dangerous
man to be released from prison when he might have
been held, and he then injures someone else, that is
certainly "unsafe" and may also be considered
unjust. But, before we confront this problem headon, let us consider some of the social and legal
realities of the context of this debate.
Suppose we abandon dangerousness as one of the
criteria of sentencing-what will happen then? If
we do not attempt to select from among the population of violent felons those who are deemed least
likely to be dangerous in the future, what will be
done with this undifferentiated mass of serious
offenders? Will society demand that we let them all
go, as we cannot say with certainty which of them
pose a serious risk to the community? Somehow,
that lacks the ring of plausability. If we do not differentiate among felons according to their potential for
future harm, the public's demand is likely to be that
we lock all of them away for long, incapacitating
sentences-"just to be on the safe side." That is why
the real alternative to indeterminate sentencing is
not the short, fixed sentences that most criminologists consider "adequate." Rather, it is long, fixed
sentences.
Differentiation among offenders according to their
dangerousness is now an established part of legal
doctrine. One of the elements of this doctrine,
however, is that the differentiation must be individualized rather than categoric. A line of cases, for
example, prohibits the use of "fixed and mechanical"
...
See, e.g.,
supra note 9.

MORRIS,

supra note 3, at 66; Von Hirsch,

[Vol. 67

decision rules in sentencing and requires, instead, "a

careful appraisal of the variable components relevant
to the sentence upon an individual basis." ' The
rationale of these cases is illustrated by the following
statements of the California Supreme Court:
The whole concept of our procedure is that special
diagnosis and treatment be accorded the psychological
and emotional problems of each offender so that he
achieves a satisfactory adjustment. Nothing could be
further from the spirit of the law than the absorption of
the individual into a stereotype. A mechanized, mass
treatment of offenders not only violates our deep
conviction that each individual should personally
obtain the protection of due process of law but also
thwarts the legislative objective -,f
providing ...
particularized treatment directed toward rehabilitation. 1"
And:
A determination on term-fixing and parole at the
outset of imprisonment which precludes . .. future
consideration nullifies the Legislature's intent that
prisoners-particularly "first termers"-who demonstrate a receptiveness to reform and a disposition
toward rehabilitation should receive more lenient
treatment.... The result of such a determination is
that some convicted persons are categorically denied
early release or parole notwithstanding their good
conduct in prison and their efforts at selfimprovement. "'
.. United States v. Schwarz, 500 F.2d 1350, 1352 (2d
Cir. 1974) (sentence vacated where trial judge refused to
make a finding of whether drug offender would benefit from
treatment under the Youth Corrections Act).
...
In re M., 3 Cal. 3d 16, 31, 473 P.2d 737, 748, 89
Cal. Rptr. 33, 44 (1970), quoted with approval and applied
to parole decisions in In re Minnis, 7 Cal. 3d 639, 646, 498
P.2d 997, 1002, 102 Cal. Rptr. 749, 754 (1972) (ordering
correctional Authority, which had set prisoner's term at
maximum and refused to consider further applications for
parole, to consider future parole applications).
161n re Minnis, 7 Cal. 3d at 647-48, 498 P.2d at
1003, 102 Cal. Rptr. at 755.
One might question the justice of conditioning the
severity of punishment on factors that a person is powerless
to change. To do so means that the offender must carry with
him all the baggage of his past life-his prior offenses and
his background characteristics-and that there is nothing
he can do to erase the record, there is no amount of
reformation that will relieve him of the burden. In a sense,
one could say that this places the offender in a status; once
he has been convicted of stealing, he is forever labelled a
thief, at least for the purpose of determining future
punishments. And, since he is powerless to remove himself
from this status, to punish him on that basis would be
"cruel and unusual" within the reasoning of Robinson v.
California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962). But this logic fails to
distinguish statuses in which the individual is placed
without his exercise of any choice from those in which he
places himself by his own volitional acts. Unless one makes
this distinction-and the Robinson majority opinion specif-
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As these quotations make clear, the courts that have
articulated the "fixed and mechanical" doctrine still
adhere to the rehabilitative ideal (or, at least, defer to
legislatures whom they believe to embrace that

ically noted that the status of narcotic addiction was one
that could be innocently acquired (the Court did not address
the probabilityof volitional addiction), 370 U.S. at 667-it
would be cruel and unusual to impose a more harsh
punishment on prior offenders than on first offenders. It
seems to us that the important point is not that the offender
is now powerless to change the sentencing variable-that is
true of any event that has been completed, and there are
many good reasons that make it just to punish one who has
committed an act of assault even though he may have
repented soon after the act and though he is, of course, now
powerless to change the fact.
We believe, then, that the more relevant criterion is
whether the offender has placed himself, by at least some
exercise of his own choice, within the classification used in
the sentencing decision. Thus, we would exclude as impermissible classifications, regardless of their predictive power,
such variables as age, sex, I.Q. and race. On the other
hand, it would clearly be permissible to take into consideration prior offenses or disciplinary infractions, where the
classifications are premised upon the commission of culpable acts, always assuming that the classifications meet some
minimum standards of reliability and validity. A more
difficult case, perhaps, is a factor such as "age at first
arrest," where the event on which the classification is based
may be quite remote in time from the present offense. (Of
course, the age at first arrest should not be less than that at
which a person becomes legally responsible for his
crimes-when he is no longer entitled to the defense of
infancy. In Illinois, that age is thirteen. ILL. REV. STAT. ch.
38, § 6-1 (1975).) It might be possible, we suppose, to
evolve a set of principles whereby factors regarded as "too
remote" would be excluded from the sentencing calculus,
but we would generally be willing to adhere to the
proposition that classifications based upon the offender's
own volitional acts are permissible.
Even more difficult issues are presented by classifications
based upon acts that are not generally regarded as culpable
or upon events that are less clearly within the control of the
offender. As examples, we might think of factors such as
education, employment history, or marital status. Even
though many persons may not approve of leaving school
early, of a lack of industry, or of divorce, these are not
culpable in the same sense as crimes or disciplinary
infractions. One might also construct an appealing argument that these characteristics of the offender are determined not so much by his own acts as by the acts of others
or by the social system generally. The great problem with
such "social determinism" is that it is very difficult to know
where to draw the lines. It is not a very long step from
socially determined unemployment to socially determined
stealing of a loaf of bread or an automobile. Generally
speaking, we would be willing to assume that a complex
series of the individual's own volitional decisions and
actions is at least an important contributing cause of
whether he is married or not, whether he stayed in school,
and whether he was employed. Therefore, we do not believe
that it would violate our principle of choice to use such
criteria in sentencing decisions.

ideal). Given the doubt that has now been cast on the
efficacy of rehabilitative treatment, that part bf the
doctrine would seem ripe for reconsideration.
But one might well question whether actuarial
techniques like the Federal Guideline Table and
Salient Factor Score run afoul of the rule against
"fixed and mechanical" decisions, even as that rule
presently stands. An argument can certainly be made
that actuarial predictions do take into account the
individual offender's characteristics, but that the
several factors are merely weighted or summed in a
systematic fashion; thus, the release decisions might
be considered to be "individualized." On the other
hand, there is the language in the courts' opinions
condemning "stereotyped," "mechanized," or "cate1 7
gorical" decisions, and the Yale Law Journal 1 has
concluded that, were it not for the fact that the
federal regulations permit decisions contrary to the
Guidelines, the federal parole prediction system
might well violate the "fixed and mechanical"
doctrine. Moreover, Yale is also concerned about the
limitation that another area of doctrine places upon
the use of risk predictions:
In the face of mathematical tables purporting to
predict risk, the denial of any opportunity to demonstrate that one is in fact a better risk might render the
parole prognosis an 'irrebuttable presumption' of recidivism. Such an irrebuttable presumption would be an
infringement of due process."'
9
°
In a recent, much-criticized . line of decisions,i6
containing an undigested mixture of elements of both
due process and equal protection, the Supreme Court
has declared that irrebuttable or "conclusive" presumptions are unconstitutional unless they are "nec' '
essarily or universally true in fact." s This standard, of course, is much more stringent than the tests
' 57See YALE L.J., supra note 8, at 872.
iSSId. at 863 n.266.
1593ee, e.g.,
Note, The Irrebuttable Presumption Doctrine in the Supreme Court,87 HARV. L. REv. 1534 (1974)
[hereinafter cited as HARV. L. REv.]; Note, The Conclusive
Presumption Doctrine: Equal Process or Due Protection?,
72 Mien. L. REV. 800 (1974); Note, Irrebuttable Presumptions: An Illusory Analysis, 27 STAN. L. REv. 449
(1975). But see Tribe, Childhood, Suspect Classifications,
and Conclusive Presumptions: Three Linked Riddles, 1974
(unpublished manuscript); Tribe, Structural Due Process,
10 HARV. Civ. RIGsTS-CIv. LIB. L. REV. 269, 283-89
(1975).
16Cleveland Bd. of Edue. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632
(1974); United States Dep't of Agriculture v. Murry, 413
U.S. 508 (1973); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972);
Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535 (1971).
I Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441, 452 (1973). For such
a presumption to be unconstitutional, it is also necessary
that the state have available to it "reasonable alternative
means of making the crucial determination." Id. The
question remains open of what additional amount of time
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usually used under either due process or equal
protection. '62

Since the real world seldom achieves perfection,
the law has usually been wise enough not to demand
it. To illustrate the degree of accuracy in prediction
that might reasonably be required of parole decisionmaking, let us consider some examples of other uses
of risk predictions.
The law employs many such predictive classifications, even where criminal sanctions are imposed.
The Illinois Criminal Code, for example, prohibits a
person from possessing a firearm while "hooded,
robed, or masked in such manner as to conceal his
identity." 16 Presumably, the reason behind the
statute is a prediction that one who is armed and
disguised is likely to be up to no good. Yet, can it be
said of this prediction or "presumption" that it is
"necessarily or universally true in fact"? What of the
quail hunter in a remote cornfield who wears a ski
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mask for protection from the freezing wind? Another
example from the law of firearms is the common
prohibition against the possession of guns by persons
previously convicted of felonies, 164 by former mental
patients,165 or by narcotics addicts. 166 These are, of
course, all based upon a legislative prediction (or
"presumption") of the dangerousness of such persons
when armed. The categories used are typically quite
broad-e.g., anyone who was a patient in a mental
institution within the past five years. 167 It is quite
possible, of course, that the former mental patient is
fully recovered and is, in fact, less dangerous than
many of the untreated persons who are permitted to
possess weapons, but the statute requires no inquiry
into the likelihood that any individual defendant
would be dangerous. It could certainly not be argued
that any of these predictions is "necessarily or
universally true in fact." 16
The prediction of dangerousness enters into the
criminal law's decisions with such frequency that it
may almost be said to be ubiquitous. It may well be
an element, for example, in arrest and prosecution
decisions. In exercising their discretion to arrest or to
prosecute, officials often take into account their
assessment of the likelihood that an offender will sin
again. 'Juries or even judges may let such considerations influence their decisions on guilt or innocence.

and effort may "reasonably" be required of the state in
order to make this determination.
'See HARV. L. REV., supra note 159, at 1545-47.
Not only is this standard clearly much more strict than
the "rational relation" test, it would also appear to exceed
the O'Brien four-part test used in free speech cases:
[W]e think it clear that a government regulation is
sufficiently justified if it is within the constitutional
power of the Government; if it furthers an important
or substantial governmental interest; if the govern'See, e.g., ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 24-3.1(a)(3)
mental interest is unrelated to the suppression of
(1975).
free expression; and if the incidental restriction on
...
Id. § 24-3.1 (a)(5).
alleged First Amendment freedoms is no greater than
...
Id. § 24-3.1 (a)(4).
is essential to the furtherance of that interest.
"'Id. § 24-3.1 (a)(5).
United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968) (draft
"'See note 161 and accompanying text supra. One
card burning held not "symbolic speech" protected by the might not wish to see these laws enforced in either of the
First Amendment). Even if the governmental interest were hypothesized circumstances, but, provided at least that such
said to be "compelling," or the regulation to be "necessary"
circumstances can be expected to occur relatively infreor essential to that interest, the presumption or prediction quently, their possibility is not generally thought to
on which the regulation was based might, of course, still be invalidate these prophylactic statutes. We deal with the
fallible.
problem, rather, by relying on presecutorial discretion or,
In two of the conclusive presumption cases, however, the at most, by preserving the option of declaring the statute
Court has suggested that defining the statutory category "unconstitutional as applied" where the facts do not fit the
more narrowly might suffice to avoid the due process statute's rationale.
hearing that the Court would otherwise require to deterOne might also question whether the "masked gunman"
mine the probability or circumstances applying to the statute is constitutional without a scienter requirement. To
individual party. Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414
the best of our knowledge, its validity has not been tested.
U.S. 632, 647 n.13 (1974); Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. Unlike the felon registration requirement in Lambert v.
441, 452-53 n.9 (1973). See note 207 infra. Of course, this California, 355 U.S. 225 (1957), however, the masked
more narrow presumption is not likely to be so tightly gunman statute requires affirmative acts, though those acts
drawn that it becomes "necessarily or universally true in may be only mala prohibita. Given the latitude generally
fact"-that would often require a category that includes an
permitted by the courts in the mental state requirements of
"N" of one. But this hedging of the principle, together with possession statutes, it seems likely that possession of a
the qualification that the state have available "reasonable weapon combined with the act of masking would be held
alternative means" (see note 146 supra), may not put the sufficient. See W. LAFAVE & A. SCOTT, HANDBOOK ON
doctrine much beyond the fourth part of the O'Brien CRIMINAL LAW 144-45, 182-83, 218-22 (1972).
test-that the restriction be "no greater than is essen"'See, e.g., W. LAFAVE, ARREST: THE DECISION TO
tial"-which, however, only applies to the "specially TAKE A SUSPECT INTO CUSTODY, 23, 137-41 (1965); F.
protected" first amendment rights.
16ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38. § 24-1(a)(9) (1975).

MILLER, PROSECUTION: THE DECISION TO CHARGE A
SUSPECT WITH A CRIME 189-90, 209, 212 (1970).
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It seems to us that the use of risk prediction in parole
decisions is neither more nor less just, as a matter of
principle, than its use in these other contexts. We
would argue, however, that the degree of fairness in
the use of such predictions is determined by the
degree of accuracy of the predictions, and that the
accuracy of the predictions used in the paroling
process, where they tend to be made more systematically, more formally, and more consciously, is likely
to be greater than in the other examples given. This
brings us back, then, to the central criticism of the
use of risk prediction.
False Positives-and True Negatives
As noted above, there are two results of error in
prediction. One is that people who are, in fact,
dangerous will be released; the other is that people
who are not dangerous will be deprived of liberty.
Because of the observed tendency to overpredict
dangerousness, there are likely to be more of the
second group, usually referred to as the "false
positives"-i.e., those falsely predicted to be
dangerous. 170 Critics of the use of these predictions in
sentencing pose the issue as one of whether it is fair
to the false positive to keep him locked up because of
the prediction. But, given the American predisposition for long sentences, 171 we might put the issue
somewhat differently: What is the justification for
continuing to hold in prison, beyond the minimum
period required for the purpose of general deterrence, any inmate whom we believe, based upon the
best evidence and the most accurate predictive techniques currently available, to pose no substantial
threat of further harm to society? In attempting to
answer this question, let us make two realistic
assumptions, arguendo. The first is that most American inmates are now held in prison far longer than
would be necessary to serve the purpose of general
deterrence; the best of the scanty data available
indicates that, while certainty of punishment may
1In
the real world, one side of this predictive failure is
concealed. Since the false positives remain locked-up, we
never find out who or how many they are. The false
negatives do become known, of course. They are released
and commit crimes, probably resulting in public demand
that the cut-off point on the predictive scale be placed at a
higher, even "safer" level, thus inevitably increasing the
amount of concealed deprivation of liberty.
.. American sentences are widely and frequently reported to be "the longest in the Western world." See, e.g.,
A PROGRAM FOR PRISON REFORM, supra note 139, at 11,
Recommendation IX; FRANKEL, supra note 8, at 58;
Kastenmeir & Eglit, supra note 4, at 523 n.172. But see
Mueller, Imprisonment and ItsAlternatives, in A PROGRAMI FOR PRISON REFORM, supra note 139, at 33, 34-35.

exhibit a degree of association with the crime rate,
no significant association can be found with severity
of punishment, alone. 172 The second assumption is
that additional time in prison does not help to reform
or rehabilitate the offender. Available data may or
may not indicate that prisons make people worse,
that they are "schools for crime," but it certainly
does not suggest that it makes them better. 171 If both
of these assumptions can be accepted, then why
should we continue to hold an inmate whom we predict to be harmless? One possible answer is that our
predictions are so abysmally inaccurate that basing
such a consequential decision on them would be irresponsible and unfair. If there is too much error in
the prediction, we may say that it is unjust (or even,
possibly, illegal) to use it in sentencing because it
discriminates among offenders on a ground that is
not "principled" or that lacks a sufficient, "rational"
relation to the lawful purpose-or, asJustice Stewart
said of the imposition of the death penalty, it is
"cruel and unusual in the same way that being struck
by lightning is cruel and unusual.... [PJ etitioners
are among a capriciously selected random handful
upon whom the sentence of death has in fact been
imposed." 174 Our notion of equal protection requires
that punishment not be distributed randomly or in
accordance with rules that achieve their objectives at
a rate not much better than chance. Therefore, we
need to examine the level of accuracy of our current
predictions. Moreover, we need to understand that
the justice of using the prediction depends not only
on the percentage of cases that the predictor classifies
correctly, but also upon the frequency or rarity with
which the predicted behavior occurs in the population or tested group. 175
To illustrate the false positives problem at its
worst, let us assume that we wish to identify those
members of the public who are "sexual psychopaths"
""See Antunes & Hunt, The Impact of Certainty and
Severity of Punishment on Levels of Crime in American
States: An Extended Analysis, 64 J. CRIN,. L. & C. 486
(1973). Antunes & Hunt did, however, identify an interaction effect suggesting that increased severity might be
efficacious under conditions of high certainty. Id. at 492.
'"See GLASER, supra note 119, at 303; R. HOOD & R.
SPARKS, KEY ISSUES IN CRIMINOLOGY 215 et seq. (1970)
[hereinafter cited HOOD & SPARKS]; Martinson, What
Works?-Questions and Answers about PrisonReform, 35
THE PUBLIC INTEREST 22, 36-38 (1974).
74
' Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 309-10 (1972)
(Stewart, J., concurring).
'See T. HIRSCHI & SELVIN, DELINQUENCY RESEARCH
235-56 (1967), reprinted in THE CRIMINAL IN
CONFINEMENT 409, 412-13 (L. Radzinowicz & M. Wolfgang eds. 1971) [hereinafter cited as RADZINOWICZ &
WOLFGANO. See also note 177 infra.
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and will commit acts of sexual molestation of
children. Our goal, of course, is to identify these
persons before they have committed any such acts so
that irreparable harm to the children may be
prevented, probably by incarcerating those persons
determined to be psychopaths. Suppose, further, that
the incidence in the population of persons who would
in fact commit such acts of molestation is one in
10,000 (an assumption wildly on the high side,
chosen to understate the seriousness of the false
positives problem-the rarer the behavior is, the
more serious the problem will be), and that we have
a really good screening device for differentiating the
psychopaths from the normals, a test that classifies
correctly 90 per cent 1 7 of the time (again, an extremely conservative assumption, probably far exceeding the accuracy of any available test). Under
these assumptions, the scorecard would look like
this:
ForEvery 100,000 in the Population
Psychopaths correctly classified as
psychopaths
Psychopaths incorrectly classified
as normal
Normals correctly classified as normal
Normals incorrectly classified as psychopaths

9
1
89,991
9,999

The last category, of course, is the one that we call
the "false positives." Presumably, this example will
serve to explicate the full horror of the false positives
problem. Note that, even though the prediction is
functioning at a level very substantially better than
chance, the results are still intolerable. "'
Grave as the false positives problem undoubtedly
is, however, it diminishes somewhat under other sets
of assumptions. First, and probably most important,
is the frequency point. Suppose, for example, that we
wish to predict the likelihood of recidivism in a
population of previously convicted property of.7.
It is not necessarily the case, of course, that the
predictor will classify both the positives and the negatives
with the same degree of accuracy-indeed, most predictive
devices will be likely to be more accurate in one direction
than the other-but we will use the ninety per cent
assumption for both, here, in order to simplify the example.
17 7
It would, of course, have been much more accurate
simply to predict that none of the people in the population
were psychopaths. Since the base rate was only one in
10,000, predicting that everyone was normal would have
resulted in a "success" rate of 99.99 per cent. This also
demonstrates that the observed tendency to overpredict
dangerousness is, in part at least, produced by the rarity
of the behavior in the population. See note 175 supra.
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fenders, persons convicted of crimes such as auto
theft, forgery, or burglary. The expected recidivism
rate of such a population may well be in excess of
50 per cent. 17 For the sake of argument, assume a
rate of 60 per cent, and assume that our predictive
device classifies accurately 75 per cent of the time.
That would produce these results:
For Every 100 Convicted Persons
"Potential" future offenders correctly
classified and held
Future offenders incorrectly classified
and released
Non-offenders correctly classified and
released
Non-offenders incorrectly classified
and held
Well, it is certainly nothing to cheer about; we still
have ten false positives who continue to sit in prison
when they "deserve" to be out on parole-at least,
they deserve it more than the fifteen violators who
have been incorrectly released. And, pending the
nirvana when we achieve perfection in prediction,
when our "presumptions" become "necessarily or
universally true in fact,"" ' there will always be
some false positives. But perhaps this is more
tolerable when we are dealing with a population
consisting entirely of persons who have already been
convicted of a specific offense and the only issue is the
length of their sentences. That is, there may be an
important difference between using these predictions
in deciding whether to punish someone and using
them in deciding when to terminate a punishment
that has already been imposed. It seems to be generally regarded as less repugnant to punish someone
who has committed an offense, even if other offenders are punished less or are not punished at all,
than it is to punish someone who has not committed
an offense. 1s This principle is buttressed by the
"'See GLASER, supra note 119, at 41-48; Glaser &
O'Leary, The Results of Parole, in RADZINOWICZ &
WOLFGANG,

supra note 175, at 245, 256-57.

...
See notes 158-62 supra, and note 207 infra.
"'When dealing with the decision about guilt or
innocence, we like to think that we are very careful (e.g., the
requirement that the proof of guilt be free of any "reasonable doubt"), but, when it comes to sentencing the convicted
offender, the trial judge's discretion is constrained only by
the broadest standards of abuse. See, e.g., United States v.
Willard, 445 F.2d 814, 816 (7th Cir. 1971); People ex rel.
Ward v. Moran, 54 Ill. 2d 552, 301 N.E.2d 300 (1973);
People v. Burbank, 53 I11.
2d 261, 275, 291 N.E.2d 161,
169 (1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 951 (1973). See also 53
Ill. 2d at 279, 291 N.E.2d at 171 (Goldenhersh & Schaefer,

SENTENCING BY PAROLE BOARD

probability that the frequency of future offenses will
be significantly greater among most groups of convicted offenders than among the public at large.
Now, having worried so much about equal treatment for the false positives, let us express a little
concern for the true negatives, i.e., those who are
classified as not dangerous and who are, in fact, not
dangerous. Is it fair to them to continue to keep them
locked up? So long as we focus only on the issue of
dangerousness-on the fact that, to the best of our
knowledge and belief, this inmate will not commit
another crime if released-there is a perfectly good
answer to our question. We may want to continue to
hold him because the criminal law has other goals or
values that it may wish to implement through his
incarceration. Among these other goals may be
general deterrence, or channeling the victim's desire
for revenge through legitimate procedures and thus
regulating it, or avoiding the appearance of "depreciating the seriousness of the offense" and thus
satisfying the society's demand for retribution, and so
on. But when one begins to examine these other
criteria that enter into sentencing decisions, one may
ask whether they are more likely to promote equality
of treatment, whether they are less subject to random
variation in their application, than are predictions of
dangerousness.

the paucity of hard data about deterrence see

HOOD & SPARKS, supra note 173, at 172-75; Schwartz &

A fair amount of scientific effort has been devoted
to testing both the reliability and the validity of our
JJ., dissenting). These standards remain in spite of
considerable evidence that this practice results in serious
disparities between the sentences given similar offenders
for similar crimes. See DAvIS, supra note 38, at 133-35;
Peter W. Low, Sentencing Structure for the Federal Criminal Code, at _27-36 (memorandum to the National
Comm'n on Reform of the Fed. Crim. Law, 1968),
CRIMINAL IN THE ARMS OF THE LAW

'See MORRIS, supra note 3, at 66-73. See generally
Kozol, Boucher & Garofalo, The Diagnosisand Treatment
of Dangerousness,18 CRIME & DELINQUENCY 371 (1972);
Steadman & Keveles, The Community Adjustment and
Criminal Activity of the Baxtrom Patients: 1966-70, 129
A~i. J.
PSYCHIATRY 304 (1972); Von Hirsch, supranote 9.
2
:8 MORRIS, supra note 3, at 59, 79.
83
'
Id. at 60, 73-76.
'On

Sentencing Standards-TheirReliability and
Validity

reprinted in THE

predictions of dangerousness, and they have been
found wanting. "' Criminologists are, therefore', uneasy about using these predictions as a basis for
important legal decisions affecting individual liberty
and public safety. But the legal system must continue
to make sentencing decisions, and, if dangerousness
is not to be one of the criteria used in those decisions,
what are the alternative standards to be? Norval
Morris proposes two: "parsimony," by which he
means that "the least restrictive ... sanction necessary to achieve defined social purposes should be
imposed" (and the chief social purpose appears to be
general deterrence),"' and "desert," which means
that "no sanction should be imposed greater than
that which is 'deserved'" by the crime. "' The
problem with these alternative standards is that their
reliability and validity are unknown. Insofar as they
are quantifiable, data that might test the accuracy of
possible measures of these criteria are either very
sparse or totally lacking. 8'

525

(L. Radzinowicz & M. Wolfgang eds. 1971).
And we certainly do not require that all persons who
have committed an offense be prosecuted. See, e.g., Smith v.
United States, 375 F.2d 243, 247 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
389 U.S. 841 (1967) -(action under Federal Tort Claims Act
for damages alleged to result from failure to prosecute
intimidation of a federal juror; held that, prosecutorial
discretion may be based on national policy, including racial
policy); Powell v. Katzenbach, 359 F.2d 234 (D.C. Cir.
1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 906 (1966) (mandamus to
compel prosecution of a national bank and others for
conspiracy); United States v. Cox, 342 F.2d 167, 171 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 935 (1965) (where grand
jury had voted indictments, held within the discretion
of the prosecutor whether to sign, and thus validate,
the indictments).

Orleans, On Legal Sanctions, 34 U. CM. L. REV. 274
(1967); Tittle & Logan, Sanctions and Deviance: Evidence
and Remaining Questions, 7 LAW & Soc'v REV. 371
(1973); Tullock, Does Punishment Deter Crime?, 36 THE
PUBLIC INTEREST 103 (1974). See also J. ANDENAES,
PUNISHMENT AND DETERRENCE (1974); F. ZIMRING,
PERSPECTIVES ON DETERRENCE (1971); F. ZIMRING &
G. HAWKINS, DETERRENCE: THE LEGAL THREAT IN
CRIME CONTROL (1973).

As for desert, it may appear to be different in kind from
either dangerousness or deterrence. Both dangerousness and
deterrence are empirical standards; they are both concerned
with propositions about what behaviors are likely to follow
in the future as a consequence of the present sentencing
decision. Desert, by contrast, sounds like purely a moral
issue, a question of principle. It involves no prediction, but
rather is a question of what justice or fairness requires as
punishment for this crime. As such, desert may not seem to
be amenable to measurement.
But this requires us to examine more closely what we
mean by a concept of desert that we would wish to use as a
standard for sentencing. If all we mean by it is the
individual sentencer's sense of moral outrage at the
crime-his feeling that mitigating circumstances make
mercy appropriate or, conversely, that the repellant facts of
the case call for harsh punishment-then the standard is,
indeed, personal, particularistic (and, perhaps, idiosyncratic), and, therefore, unreviewable. On the other hand, if
our concept of desert implies some sort of broader, societal
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Compared to predictions of dangerousness, decisions about deterrence and desert are likely to be
more subjective, more individualized, more particularistic, and thus less amenable to review. It may
be contended that deterrence and desert are fairer
standards to use precisely because they do not appear
to be "scientific" and thus unassailable; they acknowledge the subjectivity of the judgments involved
and thereby open them to argument. But this is no
guarantee of even-handedness, of equality of treatment. The large number of judges, of disparate
views, who will be making these decisions is likely to
produce a high degree of variability across cases. "'
This variability will be increased by the subjectivity
of the standards. Unlike the prediction of dangerousness, where the goal of the predictions and thus the
appropriate measure of their performance is relatively clear, the lack of good measures of deterrence
and desert serves to mask the failures of those
standards, to conceal their cases of misclassification,
to disguise the degree to which they distribute
punishments randomly. In sum, the amount of
injustice that results from the use of desert and
deterrence as sentencing standards is unknown, if not
unknowable.
judgment about the amount of punishment that is appropriate for the offense, then there is, in theory at least, some
consensus or body of opinion extant in the world by which
any sentencing decision based on desert might be measured.
Because of the virtually unlimited number of variables that
might be thought to affect the amount of punishment
deserved by various crimes, however, it would probably be
impossible to design and execute a broadly acceptable
survey of this opinion that could serve as the standard of
measurement. The legislatively-imposed limits on the sentences for each type of crime may provide another sort of
measure of societal judgments about desert, but the question
before the judges and the parole boards is how to exercise
their discretion within the rather broad limits set by most
legislatures for most crimes. If, then, there is in theory some
standard for measuring individual judgments of desert, but
we have no way of determining or expressing that standard,
the problem with desert is much like that with dangerousness or deterrence-we do not know how often the
individual sentencing decisions fail to comport with their
criteria, with the objectives or purposes that they are
thought to serve. If one adopts the personalized, particularistic view of desert, and thus concludes that it is not even in
theory measurable, the problem is obviously just as bad.
Either way, there can be no assessment of the degree of
even-handedness (or lack thereof) in the sentencing decisions.
Norval Morris makes it clear that he intends a community standard of desert. MORRIS, supra note 3, at 74.
"'See generally M. FRANKEL, supra note 8; Motley,
"Law and Order" and the Criminal Justice System, 64 J.
CRIM. L. & C. 259 (1973). See also treatises cited at note
180 supra.
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Of course, it is not always irrational to prefer the
unknown to the known, but it is necessarily risky.
Who knows what evil lurks in the depths of desert?
When such unreviewable standards are used, the
potential for abuse is increased. 18 The more subjective the standard, the less constraint there is on the
exercise of personal prejudice, on variations in

judicial temperament, or on sheer caprice-whi'ch
brings us back to the issue of whether it would be
preferable to return all or most of the sentencing

discretion to the judiciary.
One of the good reasons for having a parole board
is to reduce some of the variability in sentencing by
vesting at least a portion of the sentencing power in a
unitary corporate body. Of course, if the board then
re-delegates this power to a gaggle of correctional
sociologists, this reason is frustrated. But if the board
makes the decisions as a corporate body, the variability should be considerably less than if scores of
individual judges exercised all of the sentencing
discretion. There are some techniques, such assentencing councils, that can be used to reduce the
variability among individual judges, ' but these are
essentially half-way measures intended to make the
judges' decisions more nearly approximate those of a
corporate body. So long as the individual judges
retain discretion and so long as there are many more
judges than parole board members, board sentencing

should produce less variability than judicial sentencing. And there is another reason for preferring the
parole boards to the judges-parole boards seem
somewhat more likely than judges to use actuarial
techniques in making their decisions. Judges typically display suspicion or even hostility toward the
use of statistical bases for sentencing. 188
18 5

See DAVIS, supra note 38.

'See

FRANKEL, supra note 8, at 69-74. But note that

the few sentencing council systems that exist always leave
the ultimate decision with the individual judge. See also,
Diamond & Zeisel, Sentencing Councils: A Study of Sentence Disparity and its Reduction, 43 U. CHI. L. REv. 109
(1975); Smith, The Sentencing Council and the Problem
of Disproportionate Sentences, 27 FED. PROBATION 5

(June 1963).
'For a few years, one of the authors of this article
served as a reporter at the discussions on sentencing
problems of the Illinois Judicial Conference, the annual
meeting of all the judges in the state. At one of those
sessions, he made what he considered the rather innocuous
suggestion that, when imposing sentence, the judges might
find it helpful to know what sentences had recently been
given by their brethren to offenders with similar characteristics, and that this might be efficiently accomplished by the
use of automatic data retrieval equipment. In spite of the
fact that this was clearly no more than a proposal for
information gathering and communication-something that
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This is not to say, of course, that parole boards
now make optimal" 89 use of actuarial prediction
methods. ' We have already commented on the
Illinois Parole Board's apparent reliance on factors
that do not predict parole success 19 ' and on the
clinical assessments of correctional sociologists.192
The Federal Parole Board's Salient FactorScore is a
validated measure of the risk of parole violation, "
but the federal regulations permit decisions contrary
to the prediction "where circumstances warrant." 94
I
Subparagraph (a) states that a purpose of the
guidelines is to "promote a more consistent exercise
of discretion, and enable fairer and more equitable
decision-making without removing individual case
consideration." Subparagraph (b) says that the
"time ranges specified by the guidelines are
established specifically for the cases with good institutional adjustment and program progress," even
though adjustment to the institution and program
progress have been shown not to be significant predictors of parole success. Even worse, subparagraph
(c) provides:
Where the circumstances warrant, decisions outside of
the guidelines (either above or below) may be rendered. For example, cases with exceptionally good
institutional program achievement may be considered
for earlier release.
Subparagraph (d) permits deviation from the severity
ratings of the offenses, and subparagraph (e) prowas already being partially accomplished at greater expense
and with more error by filing clerks and through hallway
conversation between the judges-the suggestion brought
forth from the judges loud and lengthy abuse of the
unfortunate reporter. Their Honors railed about the evils
of "push-button justice," about poor defendants being
"folded, spindled, and mutilated," and about how the

computers could never get their American Express card
bills right. Were it not for the famous equanimity of the

judicial temperament, the reporter dares not think how he
might have been treated.
""9 For a discussion of what might be the "optimal" use
of actuarial techniques see notes 198-204 infra.
19°See Evjen, Current Thinking on Parole Prediction
Tables, 8 CRIME & DELINQUENCY 215 (1962), reprinted in
B. KAY & C. VEDDER, PROBATION AND PAROLE 139
(1963). Of the forty-eight jurisdictions that responded to
Evjen's questions about whether they had used "prediction

statistics (schedules, ratings, etc.)," forty-four answered
that they "had never used prediction statistics in parole
selection and are not now [1961] using them." Id. at 140.
9'See notes 123-25 and accompanying text supra.
1 92
See text accompanying Table VI supra.
3
19 See YALE L.J., sopra note 8, at 872-73 n.308.
19"28 C.F.R. § 2.20(e) (1975). See text accompanying
note 195 infra; the intervening quotations are all from this
same source.

vides that the ".... 'Salient Factor Score' serves as
an aid in determining the parole prognosis," but that
"where circumstances warrant, clinical evaluation
of risk may override this predictive aid.""" 5 It

would be hard to imagine a broader grant of discretion. Some of this waffling may be attributable to fear of running afoul of the "fixed and mechanical rules" and "irrebuttable presumption" doctrines. "" If that is the concern, meeting those issues
head-on would probably be preferable to watering
down the actuarial prediction system
so much that
1 7
it becomes a bog of compromise.
The Case for Actuarial Prediction
There is some division of opinion as to whether it
improves the accuracy of the predictions if one uses

clinical evaluations as a supplement to the actuarial
tables. Vincent O'Leary asserts that "most experts
are convinced that the optimum system is one which
uses both statistical and individual case history

methods."
argues:

19

On the other hand, Barbara Wootton

The fact that in no case do statistical methods succeed

in measuring all the relevant factors.

. . does

not...

justify overriding them in the interests of a sentimental
attachment to imponderables in cases where the latter
are demonstrably less reliable prognosticators. The
sensible course is to use one method or the other,
according to which has proved itself the more reliable
in any particular case: the mistake is to mix them. 199
In analyzing this dispute, it is helpful to distinguish between the use of clinical judgments as the
predictions, themselves, and the use of clinicians'
categorizations as part of the data incorporated in an
actuarial prediction. 2"9 In the latter case, the clinician is providing measurements of variables that may
turn out to be relevant to the prediction. In the
former case, where the clinical judgment is the
prediction, itself, the problem is that the clinician is

unlikely to combine the known variables in the
optimal way-to assign to each variable its optimal
weight and to account properly for the interaction
"'Id.at (a)(b)(c)(d) & (e) (emphasis added).
"'"See notes 154-62 and accompanying text supra.
"..See note 207 infra.
"'O'Leary, Issues and Trends in ParoleAdministration
in the UnitedStates, 11 Ai. CRXIM.L. REV. 97, 111 (1972).
19 B.
WOOTTON, SOCIAL SCIENCE AND SOCIAL
PATHOLOGY 199 (1959).
" 9See WIGGINS, supra

supra note 150, at 178-81.

note 152, at 190-93; Sawyer,
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20 1

effects among the variables.
In the actuarial
method of prediction, a regression equation is used to
compute the best combination of variables and their
optimal weights. If a clinician assigns other weights
to those variables, or takes into account other variables of unknown weight, error is likely to be introduced into the prediction. Human judgments are also
more prone to both systematic and random error
than are the mechanical devices, such as regression
equations, that humans devise in their best moments-human judgments are more likely than regression equations to be subject to prejudice, to
anxiety, to fatigue, and to boredom. On the other
hand, if the clinical judgments are sufficiently welldefined, the categorizations made by the clinicians
may be tested in the regression equation to determine
if they add to its predictive power. There is some evidence that actuarial predictions incorporating both
clinical data and more "objective" facts are superior
to actuarial predictions that use only one type of
data. '20 But the most important point is that the final
prediction should be computed statistically, rather
than arrived at through clinical judgment. 20 A valuable study of this issue by Sawyer concluded that
"the clinician may be able to contribute most not by
direct prediction, but rather by providing, in objective form, judgments to be combined mechanic-

ally."

204

Thus, insofar as sentencing decisions are to be
based on predictions of dangerousness, it would make
little difference whether judges or parole boards
made those decisions so long as both followed the
actuarial prediction tables faithfully; either could
consign the task to a computer or a clerk. It seems
probable to us that, in spite of the hedging in the
federal parole regulations and the Illinois Board's
delegations to clinicians, parole boards would be less
likely than judges to consider this to be a deprivation
of their discretionary due or to be beneath their
dignity. 20
Of course, dangerousness is not likely to become
201 Wiggins reviews and summarizes research indicating that the performance of mechanical data combination methods is superior to clinicians' judgments even
when the statistical models merely simulate the judgmental strategies of the clinicians. WIGGINS, supra note 152, at
216-22.
2
'See WIGINS, supra note 152, at 197-99; Sawyer,
supra
203 note 150, at 192.
See WIGGINS, supra note 152, at 197-98; Sawyer,
supra note 150, at 191-92.
20.
Sawyer, supra note 150, at 193.
20 0
At least some parole boards have been known to use
some actuarial techniques some of the time; if the odd judge
has done so now and again, it has escaped our notice and
that of Dr. John Paul Ryan of the research department of
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the only standard for sentencing-nor do we believe
that it should. Desert and deterrence will be retained
as sentencing criteria both because they reflect major
purposes and values of the criminal law and because
they may provide some limits to the use of the
0
dangerousness standard."' But it should be clear
that sentencers are justified in making decisions
"outside the guidelines" of the actuarial tables in
order to implement values other than risk, but not in
order to improve the prediction of risk itself.2"'
Policy Summary
In conclusion, it may even be possible to summarize our argument: If the prediction of dangerousness
the American Judicature Society, whom we consulted on
this2 matter. See also note 188 supra.
.Itmay, at first, seem appealing to think that all three
standards, desert, deterrence and dangerousness, might be
posited as concurrent limiting principles-that is, that any
given case should be required to satisfy all three of the
standards before a sentence of imprisonment is imposed.
But such a system would be unlikely to prove acceptable.
Many of the offenses that would probably rank highest on
the desert scale, e.g., serious crimes of violence against
persons, would have relatively low "dangerousness" ratings
if dangerousness were to be measured by recidivism rates.
Similarly, interpersonal violence tends to be more motivated
by emotion and thus is probably less deterrable than are
crimes of profit, such as embezzlement, which might rank
much lower on the desert scale but be much more amenable
to a rational deterrence calculus. Thus, society may well
feel that the principle of desert, alone, is sufficient justification for imposing harsh punishment for murder or mayhem,
while the deterrence factor and/or the recidivism rates may
justify imposing imprisonment for fraud or auto theft even if
those crimes are regarded as less "serious."
20.With regard to the "other values" see notes 39 and
147, and accompanying text supra.
Having concluded our analysis, we might now take
another brief look at Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441 (1973),
and the other "irrebuttable presumption" cases. See notes
159-62 supra. Those cases require that the individual be
given an opportunity to "rebut" the presumption in a due
process hearing. But all the hearing can provide, at best, is
more information on which the decision-maker may then
base his classification judgment, assigning the individual to
one category or another. The hearing is certainly no
guarantee that the classification or prediction will thereby
be perfected and that there will be no more false positives
(or, for that matter, false negatives). Thus, even after the
hearing, the prediction/presumption cannot reasonably be
expected to be "necessarily or universally true in fact."
Having had the hearing, however, the decision-maker
might console himself with the thought that he had done
everything possible to achieve accurate (and, thus, just)
classification of the individual. But, unfortunately, there is
no good evidence that consideration of the individual's
idiosyncratic circumstances will, in fact, improve the accuracy of most predictions; indeed, it is likely to make them
worse. See notes 152 and 202-04 and accompanying text
supra.
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continues to play a part in sentencing decisions-and
there are good reasons to think that it will-then we
should recognize that some kinds of predictions are
better than others. This may well be a case of settling
for "the best of a bad lot," but it is important to use
the most accurate predictors available. Greater accuracy in prediction obviously tends to promote the
public safety. It also serves the interest of fairness to
the inmate; the fairness of basing length of sentence
on a prediction increases as the validity of the
prediction increases. Actuarial predictions tend to be

more valid than clinical predictions. Because parole
boards seem more likely than judges to use actuarial
predictions, and because there is likely to be less
variability in corporate than in individual judicial
decisions, we think it preferable to leave a significant
portion of the sentencing discretion in the hands of
the parole boards. But the boards should be a good
deal more systematic than they are at present in
following actuarial prediction tables or in departing
from them only to serve explicit values other than the
prediction of recidivism or parole violation.

